Latin America and the Caribbean have often been an afterthought in US foreign policy. However, the new administration of President Donald Trump has placed a new focus on the region—with the possibility of major changes in its approach. From threats of retaking the Panama Canal to Secretary of State Marco Rubio making his first international visit to Central America, it is clear that the administration has—at least for now—made inter-American affairs a policy priority. Uncertainty about the US approach to the region has left at least some Latin American leaders looking for alternatives and explanations.
While foreign policy is rarely guided by the US military combatant commands, US-Latin American relations have been increasingly influenced by US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). While some of this is due to the “benign neglect” of the region as US foreign policy has focused its attention elsewhere, SOUTHCOM has been instrumental in shaping US-Latin American relations and signaling US priorities in the region. Each year, like other combatant commands, SOUTHCOM presents its annual posture statement to Congress. With each yearly release, observers are offered an opportunity to understand how the command views and prioritizes issues and partners in the region. That opportunity is particularly important this year, as the new administration’s foreign policy takes shape. Despite uncertainty about how the Trump administration might shift US policy vis-a-vis Latin American and Caribbean affairs, the 2025 posture statement—the first issued since Admiral Alvin Holsey assumed command of SOUTHCOM—presented a striking degree of continuity.
The Threat of Extra-Hemispheric Actors
The increased focus on Latin America and the Caribbean by the Trump administration has highlighted differences in how various members of the administration view the region and where there are opportunities for the United States to work with different countries. While Rubio has written about the need for strong neighbors and identified potential partners, Trump has lashed out at several countries in the region—including threats of taking back the Panama Canal from one of the countries that Rubio identified as a partner. In defending Trump’s position, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz noted that this approach was a “Monroe Doctrine 2.0”—an update of a nineteenth-century mainstay of US-Latin American foreign policy that is typically associated with US intervention and imperialism in the Americas. The historical comparison is not entirely new: when the Monroe Doctrine was referenced during the first Trump administration, it ruffled feathers in the region.
Those that call for a “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” typically view the need for such a policy as a response to growing Chinese influence in the Americas. Over the past decade, SOUTHCOM has been the leading voice sounding alarm bells about China and the combined threat of other extra-Hemispheric actors—particularly Russia and Iran. In the latest posture statement Holsey emphasized the role of these extra-Hemispheric actors in the region. In his statement he underscored the success of US adversaries’ soft power in addition to traditional military support. China’s economic influence through trade and the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s focus on influence and information operations, and Iran’s efforts to build political and military ties with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and now Bolivia were major security concerns raised by Holsey in his statement to Congress. Holsey’s emphasis on these actors followed trends from recent years. While last year’s posture statement saw references to China peak, this year’s returned to normal levels. References to Russia stayed consistent and there was a slight uptick in references to Iran.
In addition to direct engagement from China, Russia, and Iran, Holsey emphasized concerns over the growing efforts of multilateral organizations such as BRICS—Russia and China are founding members of the bloc, while Iran joined last year—contributing to anti-American sentiments in the region. These efforts are part of these nations’ strategy to win hearts and minds in Latin American and Caribbean nations.
Partners in an “Americas First” Foreign Policy?
While the growing presence of US adversaries in the region is concerning and should be a top security concern for the new administration, Holsey’s approach—at least thus far—represents a continuation on the part of SOUTHCOM. Holsey’s testimony highlighted that SOUTHCOM continues to center partnership within its strategy and operations. Indeed, Holsey noted that SOUTHCOM could address many of the challenges facing the region—including the growing presence of China and Russia, democratic erosion, and threats from criminal organizations—by “standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our Allies and Partners” and “meet[ing] presence with presence.” Across his posture statement, he highlighted the need to cooperate with countries in the region and strengthen not only the partnerships themselves, but the capabilities and resources available to countries in the region.
Despite continuing to center partnership within his posture statement, there was a slight decline in the number of times that Holsey used this term relative to his predecessor General Laura Richardson’s 2024 posture statement. While the decline was small, it may signal a shift in line with Trump’s view of the region. During the first Trump administration, there was a marked decline in SOUTHCOM’s framing of the region as one of partners after over a decade of steadily increasing this perspective. While too early to determine how this will impact SOUTHCOM’s position in the region, it may be an early sign of SOUTHCOM beginning to realign priorities to be more in line with the rhetoric used by the administration.
Economic Multipliers
In recent years, SOUTHCOM has increasingly voiced support for US initiatives that promote economic stability and integration across the Americas. Richardson frequently emphasized the idea that “economic security is national security” in her public appearances and in her 2024 posture statement presentation to Congress noted the importance of supporting regional financial institutions. Richardson did not only speak about the importance of economic engagement, but also traveled to the region with US Commerce Secretary Gina M. Raimondo to highlight the connections between security and economic concerns in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.
Here Holsey also continued to voice SOUTHCOM’s support for nonmilitary operations to bolster economic security in Latin America and the Caribbean. Holsey highlighted the need to showcase that US economic support is different from the quid pro quo of economic support seen from antidemocratic actors. This framing is particularly important given frequent critiques of Chinese aid being tied to economic or geopolitical concessions. This positioning of US economic support stands in stark contrast to the Trump administration’s efforts to tie many US foreign policy efforts directly to US interests. However, while US efforts to curb Chinese influence may be a driving factor for US engagement with the region, Holsey’s efforts to highlight that US engagement is not purely interest based would make it a more effective foreign policy tool for the United States.
Holsey further noted that the United States and its allies have several important tools that could be leveraged to strengthen economic ties with the region—including the US Export-Import Bank and the Development Finance Corporation—and highlighted the need to collaborate with regional financial institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank. These tools will be particularly important given the Trump administration’s recent efforts to dismantle USAID. Here, SOUTHCOM may find a valuable ally in Trump’s special envoy for Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone—who in a summer 2024 article on Trump’s Latin America foreign policy also pushed for leaning into these mechanisms and collaborating with regional financial institutions.
Can SOUTHCOM Anchor US Foreign Policy?
The Trump administration appears set to change the playbook on US-Latin American affairs by refocusing on the region, doubling down on pressure-based approaches, and seeing China and immigration as the most pressing issues in the relationship with governments in the region. The approach hinted at in SOUTHCOM’s posture statement, however, signals the possibility of more continuity than we are hearing from those in Washington. While SOUTHCOM has been among the most vocal in identifying concerns about Chinese engagement in the region, the posture statement balances the threat of China with other critical issues—including crime, corruption, and democratic backsliding. At the same time, while the administration takes firm positions and even issues threats against regional partners, SOUTHCOM’s leadership continues to call for collaboration and partnership with countries across the Western Hemisphere.
SOUTHCOM may not be the loudest voice on inter-American affairs or define the direction of all US foreign policy in the region. However, the command remains an important player in regional relations—so much so that Rubio stopped at SOUTHCOM on his return from Central America. The command’s leadership can be a steadying force in an otherwise chaotic period of regional affairs. SOUTHCOM’s posture toward the region remains focused on partnership and addressing the array of challenges facing the Americas—a view that hints at a potential degree of continuity in the US approach toward the region.
Adam Ratzlaff is a specialist and consultant in inter-American affairs as well as a member of Diplomatic Courier’s World in 2050 Brain Trust. He has previously worked with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Global Americans, among other organizations.
Emma Woods is the chair of the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy’s Latin America discussion group. She holds a BA from the University of Virginia in Spanish and global studies and is currently pursuing her master’s at Johns Hopkins SAIS.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image: The Freedom-class littoral combat ship USS Detroit transits the Panama Canal, October 13, 2020. (Credit: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nathan T. Beard, US Navy)