The rapid fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad has created a strategic inflection point that US leaders—in both the current administration of President Joe Biden and the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump—may be missing. President Biden has stated that his administration “will work with our partners and the stakeholders in Syria to help them seize an opportunity to manage the risk,” and will continue supporting partners in neighboring countries and make use of US personnel in the region to prevent the Islamic State from taking advantage of the situation. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is meeting with allies and partners in Jordan to discuss potential ways ahead, before heading to meet with leaders in Turkey, arguably the strongest actor in Syria. Contrarily, President-elect Trump posted on social media right before the fall of Assad that “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!”

Unfortunately, both approaches miss an opportunity to amplify key ramifications of Assad’s fall—namely, the weakening of Russia, Iran, and their proxies. The collapse of the Syrian regime presents a timely opportunity for the United States and its allies and partners to tip the scales in not just the Middle East, but Africa and Eastern Europe, as well. The power vacuum in Syria demands swift and decisive action, challenging the conventional wisdom that effective strategies must play out over long time horizons and require patience to see them come to fruition. In this case, Washington and like-minded capitals can advance measures to impose strategic dilemmas on Russia.

The collapse of Assad’s government was precipitated by a cascade of events. First, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine resulted in a military quagmire that has limited its ability to prop up Syria. Second, Iran probably approved the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel, provoking major Israeli reactions. Subsequent Israeli operations weakened Iranian proxies like Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, forcing many Hezbollah fighters to return to Lebanon, and abandoning their support for Assad. Iran struck Israel in response, which led to a large-scale series of Israeli “precise strikes on military targets in Iran” and elsewhere in the region. Such events reduced support for and weakened the Syrian regime. Combined with determined rebel offensives, mostly spearheaded by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham alongside widespread uprisings, pro-regime forces disintegrated and stopped supporting Assad.

We contend Western leaders can push an agenda that forces Moscow and Iran into difficult choices. The United States can easily incentivize the new Syrian government—likely to be led by many rebel commanders—to put at risk Russia’s control of its military bases inside. Meanwhile, it can also motivate rebels in eastern Libya—led mainly by the strongman Khalifa Haftar—to similarly put Russian bases in Libya at risk. These Russian bases in Syria and Libya form the backbone of Russian military power projection in the Mediterranean and throughout Africa and the Middle East. The United States can leverage the weakened position of Russian President Vladimir Putin by forcing a painful dilemma: the Mediterranean or Ukraine.

The West can seek to convince rebel leaders in both countries to let Russia have its bases in Libya and Syria in exchange for Russian concessions, like a favorable peace deal in Ukraine. Otherwise, the United States, with the help of allies and partners, can easily lobby and incentivize rebels with sufficient economic and military support to seize all Russian bases in Libya and Syria, thus removing Russia’s ability to operate across the region completely. Without quick action on either front, however, Russia may negotiate new long-term basing rights and access inside both countries.

The Opportunity at Hand

By assisting the various rebels in Libya and Syria, Russian bases can be put at risk, forcing Putin to choose between making concessions in Ukraine or losing crucial Mediterranean bases. This approach not only provides leverage against Russia but also supports the incoming Trump administration’s goals of reducing the American military presence in Syria and Iraq.

Russia’s military presence in Syria is centered around two key installations: Tartus naval base on the Mediterranean coast and the Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia. These bases are critical for Russia’s power projection in the Mediterranean and its operations in Africa. The Tartus facility, in particular, provides Russia with its only direct access to the Mediterranean Sea, allowing it to conduct naval exercises, station warships, and host nuclear submarines. Besides these two main bases, Russia has at least eighty military outposts scattered throughout Syria, and emerging reports suggest that most Russian forces are encircled across the country. Supposedly, Syrian opposition leaders have pledged to protect Russian military bases and diplomatic facilities in Syria, but this fragile guarantee is precarious and could easily be disrupted by savvy Western leaders offering a better deal. In spite of this guarantee, the new Syrian government should be reluctant to host a long-term Russian presence as Russian attacks after its 2015 intervention had killed 6,969 civilians, including 2,055 children, 1,094 women, and 70 medical personnel at schools, markets, and medical facilities, by June 2023. Worse, there is speculation at one abandoned Russian base in Deir Ezzor that Russian forces had been conducting false flag operations (provokatsia), given that the base was littered with Islamic State uniforms and flags.

The West must also consider Russia’s recent military expansion in eastern Libya and cooperation with Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, with airbases at Brak al-Shati, al-Jufra, and al-Qardabiya. Additionally, Russia may have already established a de facto naval base in Tobruk, given numerous Russian port calls and deliveries at this port. Such development suggests Putin likely hedged his bets, potentially accepting losses in Syria while attempting to consolidate his position elsewhere in the region. Western capitals must take this into account when formulating their strategy, as it could either provide additional leverage or complicate negotiations. Regardless, Western governments must accept the necessary risk of deepening engagement with Haftar for the larger strategic purposes of pushing Russia out of Libya as well.

The potential loss of these strategic bases would severely undercut Russian military capability and credibility in the Mediterranean and Africa. It would also severely limit Russia’s ability to deploy private military companies across the African continent, where their influence and access have advanced Kremlin goals as the two Syrian bases support Russian bases in Libya, which in turn support other Russian deployments throughout the continent. Russia maintains 800–1,200 troops permanently in eastern Libya, serving “as the crucial hub for Moscow’s mission in Africa due to its geographical location and political instability.” The European Council on Foreign Relations reports that, although the Russian Africa Corps “has perhaps 1,000 men in Mali; a hundred or so in Burkina Faso; an unclear number in Niger and Sudan; and about 2,000 in the [Central African Republic],” they are “deeply overstretched and losing credibility.” This overextended situation for Russia must be exploited by the Americans and Europeans. Shutting down Russian bases in Syria makes supporting forces inside Libya more difficult, and in turn makes it even more difficult to deploy Russian personnel deeper into Africa. By the West shutting down this logistical pipeline, the Russians would expend significantly more resources deploying into Africa, leading them divert even more scarce resources from their Ukraine fight, in particular strategic airlift, to support their African adventures if they are kicked out of Syria, and eventually Libya.

Navigating the Risk and Reward of Engaging Rebels

The situation in Syria will be complicated and difficult. In the coming months, numerous domestic and international actors and strongmen will likely vie for influence and power. The main Syrian rebel group, Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led most military operations that toppled the Assad regime. While HTS has expressed a willingness for a peaceful resolution and criticized Iran’s involvement in Syria, the group’s past association with extremist ideologies requires careful handling. Any attempt by the West to engage with these leaders in the new Syrian government will require most governments and the United Nations to remove the terrorist designation, which UN leaders have already been suggesting. Further legitimization will require the opening of embassies and consulates inside Syria and providing Western technocrats to help jumpstart Syrian institutions. As an example, the US government could support the development of an inclusive political system by deploying resources from both the State Department and the US Agency for International Development as well as facilitating assistance from nongovernmental organizations. Although the US embassy in Syria has suspended operations since February 2012, Secretary of State Blinken says that the United States is in direct contact with HTS. Still, there appears to be little American engagement at all in Damascus at the moment—something Moscow will keenly exploit if Western inaction in Syria continues.

Other key players include Turkey, whose aims include repatriating the three million Syrian refugees there and marginalizing Kurdish forces, and which will likely have the most external influence in a new Syria; European countries, which also want to repatriate refugees back to Syria; Iran, which likely seeks to preserve its land bridge to Hezbollah and influence in Syria; and Israel, which desires to cut off Hezbollah from Iran and make a longstanding enemy into a friendly neighbor. Within this context, Israel must be pressured into wrapping up airstrikes and other military operations in Syria, which are meant to destroy remaining regime weapon systems and munition storage sites, to effectively neuter the military capabilities of the new Syrian government and prevent proliferation. If Israeli operations, such as its Golan Heights expansion, continue much longer, it will create renewed resentment against Israel and the West. Hence, the United States must navigate these competing interests while pursuing its objectives of a free Syria that is not a threat to its neighbors, is free from Iranian and Hezbollah influence, avoids Islamic fundamentalism and repression of non-Sunni groups, and includes all legitimate Syrian actors. Above all, tight coordination among US actors, allies, and partners is vital to the success of this venture. No one actor can do it alone, but there should be enough shared consensus that the continued presence of Russian military bases in the Mediterranean is a cancer on the region: Russian bases must be cut out of the region altogether to achieve long-term stability.

Forcing a Grand Bargain?

Western powers need to view Syria and Libya through a strategic competition lens when determining their next steps: Should they assist the new Syrian government and Libyan rebels in capturing Russian bases or permit Russia to retain these assets as leverage during peace negotiations regarding Ukraine? Presently, Putin faces little pressure. However, Washington could easily rally a coalition of like-minded capitals to force Moscow into a decision between two alternatives: lose critical Mediterranean bases or negotiate a deal in Ukraine—both of which carry significant repercussions for Putin’s regime. Western powers must put both options on the table and seek a win in either region. Continued Western inaction and apathy only cedes the decision-making space to Russia.

By acting decisively now, the United States along with its allies and partners can reshape the strategic landscape in Syria, Libya, and beyond. Assuming Putin is unwilling to make concessions on its war against Ukraine, then helping newfound proxies in Syria and Libya force Russia out of its bases would cause repercussions for Putin with his domestic audience and undercut the perception of Russian military power across the Mediterranean. Additionally, it would strengthen American and European influence across the region at the expense of Iran. Resolving internal strife in Syria and Libya by helping remove Russian bases and influence would also alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis in both countries, reducing the flow of refugees into Europe—a flow that has led to the rise of right-wing populist parties and fractured domestic politics across the continent. Finally, dismantling Russian military power in the Mediterranean and Africa would remove pressure from the southern flank of NATO and would facilitate an increase in democratization, as Russian money and weapons would no longer corrupt and empower strongmen across the region.

A narrow strategic window of opportunity exists for the United States to exploit: forcing Russia into difficult choices in the Mediterranean and Ukraine. By harnessing the shifting dynamics in Syria and Libya, Western leaders can pressure Putin to make painful decisions between maintaining his military foothold in the Mediterranean or negotiating peace in Ukraine favorable to Kyiv and its supporters. This approach not only weakens Russia’s strategic positioning but also aligns with broader Western goals of reducing authoritarianism, while promoting human rights and democratization to facilitate long-term stability.

The moment is ripe for decisive action. Supporting rebel forces in both Syria and Libya will create additional dilemmas for Moscow, compelling Putin to either relinquish its only overseas bases outside of the former Soviet Union or face sustained pressure on multiple fronts. This strategy reinforces Western influence across the Mediterranean, curtails Russian adventurism, and addresses humanitarian crises that drive instability and migration. By acting now, Washington can reshape the strategic landscape, diminish Putin’s regional ambitions, further limit his reach, and foster a more stable and democratic order in the Middle East and North Africa.

G. Alexander (Alex) Crowther, PhD, is a retired US Army strategist and is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He has published in a number of formats and locations since 2005 on a variety of national security issues.

Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “Franky” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the US Naval War College, fellow at the European Resilience Initiative Center, and fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy. He has published two books and over one hundred articles on strategy and warfare.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including the Department of the Air Force and the US Naval War College. This article was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.

Image: Russian Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu inspected Russian Navy exercises in the Mediterranean Sea during a visit to Syria in February 2022. (Credit: Russian Ministry of Defense, via Wikimedia Commons)