Stop me if you’ve heard this one before. Picture it—the commander and staff are assembled in the conference room. At some point during the meeting, the commander expresses an idea to the group of twenty-odd staff and noncommissioned officers. It’s not a particularly good idea, but it isn’t exactly terrible either. Think of all the times you’ve been in this exact situation. What happens next? In my experience two things normally happen. First, there is an awkwardly long silence before anyone says anything. Then, when someone finally speaks up, the comments often begin with something to the effect of “Sir, you’re exactly right” or “Ma’am, that’s a great idea,” which is then followed by further glowingly supportive remarks. Be honest: How often have you seen this before?
The level of the command doesn’t matter—it could be battalion, brigade, division—nor does the relative experience of the rest of the participants. There is something about the culture of the US Army that elicits this sort of interaction too often. I think back to when I was a young officer, and this exact scenario played out during a discussion of the relatively mundane subject of the party favor at the upcoming unit ball. We decided on a beer glass as a table gift for everyone who attended. The commander assessed that at least two thirds of the unit would attend and at least half of them would bring dates. Both of those assumptions were shockingly inaccurate, and if there were people in the meeting who thought they might be, they didn’t voice that opinion. The unit ended up buying twice as many glasses as we needed, offering the leftovers for sale at the staff duty desk for the next three years. I think four of them were sold before the boxes were moved into a storage closet. They might still be there.
The Deference Pause and Well-Meaning Sycophancy
Let’s address both initial responses. But to do that, we must talk about the elephant in the room. The Army is a rigidly hierarchical organization. The reason is simple: a foundational truth about combat is that there will come a time when a superior gives an order to a subordinate that will put that individual in harm’s way. Self-preservation is fundamental to human nature, so countering this potent survival urge and replacing it with compliance without question requires conditioning and training. This starts at initial entry training for all soldiers and continues in their units. We are taught to recognize the importance of rank and the necessities of obedience.
The problem is that this critical combat skill has bled into other aspects of military interaction. The most potentially damning effect is the negative impact on discourse. Which brings us back to the commander and the conference room. The deference pause seems harmless at first. Who wouldn’t want to ensure that the commander is done speaking before providing a follow-on comment? The problem is that the pause adds gravity and weight to the commander’s remarks, making it more difficult to be critical of them. Silence builds tension, in movies, in music, and especially in conversation. Tension rarely works in favor of the subordinate. A natural offshoot of that tension is a desire for release. Which is how we come to those sycophantic follow-on comments. “You’re exactly right,” “We never considered that,” “This will really help the staff”—these do not add value to any substantive discourse, but they too often dominate senior/subordinate interaction. There is a leadership truism—that if two of us agree on everything, one of us is unnecessary—which is apt here. I think we can agree that we want productive discourse to allow for the best decisions through the collective consideration of hard problems, and that strict adherence to hierarchy runs counter to that aim. What remains is a consideration of how we can get better.
Another Way: An Allied Case Study
I’ve spent the last six months assigned to French Land Forces Command as a deputy commanding general. This has allowed me to participate in high-level military engagements on all manner of topics affecting French forces, from future force design to personnel and recruiting. The obvious challenge is that these discussions all take place in French. As a result, I must really pay attention and, though I often miss some of the nuance, I also need to stay attuned to the group dynamics. While the French military has all the pre- and post-meeting pomp and circumstance (we stand at attention prior to the entrance and exit of the commander), a funny thing happens during the meeting. While every topic starts as a presentation, they all end up feeling more like the Thanksgiving dinner table. Participants lean in, various members have back-and-forth engagements with the commander and with each other. There are even times when (gasp!) someone starts speaking before the last person is finished, even if that last person is the commander. There are no pauses, no wasted platitudes; it’s a free exchange of ideas. None of this takes away from the authority of the commander and when a decision is required, his is often the final voice, but not always. Time will tell if this ultimately leads to better decisions, but the richness of the dialogue is admirable. The question, though, is if it’s replicable—particularly in an organization, with a deep-seated culture of deference.
What Do We Do About It?
Army culture is difficult to change, and it is not often a quick process. The good news is that commanders may be at the heart of the problem, which positions them to lead change on the solution. It may be slow, but I would posit three recommendations for Army leaders.
First, commanders must set a tone that encourages discourse. This must be an overcorrection. The Army’s cultural tendency toward deference cannot be countered with minor adjustments. For example, saying that you are open-minded and encourage open discussion is insufficient. It will require both strong words and strong actions. Privately counsel staff members who are too supportive of your positions. Recognize that your ideas can be bad and reward pushback. Be wary of superficial changes, which will likely have the opposite effect on your people.
Second, pick smart, confident people. Your people might be your problem, and chances are you were involved in selecting them. Look for a balance between those you have worked with before and those you haven’t—and if there is a bias, make it in favor of the latter. Studying, reading, and writing can be markers for quick and agile minds. Seek those minds in your organization. Fight the tendency to favor experience over characteristics. In the words of Frederick the Great, “the faculty of combining ideas, is what distinguishes man from beasts of burden. A mule, though he should have made ten campaigns under prince Eugene, would not have improved in his tactics.”
Finally, build structures in your organization to foster healthy cynicism. Is your unit a learning organization? Popularized in Peter Senge’s The Fifth Discipline, the idea of learning organizations centers on constructing the types of groups required for the complex problems of the modern world. Commanders must develop systems that get the best out of their people, collectively, to drive better results. How a unit treats skepticism—and more importantly, whether it recognizes and encourages it—is part of the answer. Think about clarifying to your organization the times and events where discourse is critical to outcomes. Those meetings should be frequent and feel different, and your behavior should be different, freeing your subordinates to unleash their creativity and critical thinking.
None of these changes are earth shattering, but they will require a culture change in organizations. That change must start with commanders. There’s an adage that says if you want to know if you are an approachable leader, keep track if people are approaching you. An honest assessment of how healthy discourse is in Army units works the same way. Army leaders must fight against the good feeling of awed silence and hollow praise after they speak. If the commander’s ideas are not challenged, then the unit is likely operating under the dangerous assumption that those ideas are always best. This belief will not get the best out of the collective talents of our teams or solve the hardest problems facing our Army. We must do better.
Brigadier General Kareem P. “Monty” Montague currently serves as the deputy commanding general for interoperability of the French Army’s Land Forces and Operations Command.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Capt. Steven L. Wesolowski, US Army