Owning the Gray Zone
In this Army Times op-ed, Capt. John Chambers argues that to counter threats from near peers like Russia, the US Army needs to get comfortable operating in the “gray zone.”
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John Chambers | 11.07.16
In this Army Times op-ed, Capt. John Chambers argues that to counter threats from near peers like Russia, the US Army needs to get comfortable operating in the “gray zone.”
Read MoreJake Miraldi | 11.03.16
In this Modern War Institute podcast, Gen. (Ret) Michael Hayden discusses the role of intelligence in combating threats on the modern battlefield.
Read MoreJake Miraldi | 10.27.16
In this Modern War Institute podcast, US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group commander Col. Michael Loos discusses emerging threats and AWG’s role in enabling the Army to defeat them.
Read MoreJohn Chambers | 10.20.16
Capt. John Chambers offers five concrete steps that will prepare the US Army to counter hybrid threats in the gray zone.
Read MoreJohn Chambers | 10.18.16
In a new MWI Report, Capt. John Chambers examines hybrid threats and what the US Army needs to do in order to counter them.
Read MoreM. L. Cavanaugh | 01.18.15
Image from page 5 of “quad fold” for US Army TRADOC PAM 525-3-1. By Major Matt Cavanaugh I recently listened to Lieutenant General HR McMaster speak at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Note...
Read MoreWilliam Betson | 02.03.14
In July, 2006, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon in response to provocations from Hezbollah forces near the Lebanese-Israeli border. The IDF mission was to stop the firing of missiles into Israel, to obtain the release of several captured Israeli soldiers, and to force the disarming of Hezbollah militia in that region. Over-confident Israeli forces, which had been focused on counter-insurgent operations for several years, were shocked as fierce resistance brought their elite attacking formations to an abrupt halt at places like Maroun al-Ras, Bint Jbiel, and Wadi Saluki. Although there has been much argument as to whether the IDF were “defeated,” by Hezbollah “militia,” there is no doubt that the IDF failed to achieve its nation’s political objectives during the campaign. The Hezbollah militias faced by the IDF in 2006 (and later in 2008) were a formidable foe, and with their successful performance against the IDF, they represent a model for others to emulate. Indeed, a Hezbollah-like enemy comprises the most dangerous form of the “hybrid” enemy force that current US doctrine sees as its most likely future adversary.
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