In this piece for Foreign Affairs, MWI’s Maj. Mike Jackson, Dr. Lionel Beehner, and Dr. Benedetta Berti examine modern-day siege warfare in urban environments, and how it impacts counterinsurgency operations.
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Maj. John Spencer argues that the miles of concrete walls that lined streets and surrounded bases in Baghdad demonstrate that the most effective weapon in an urban counterinsurgency is concrete.
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MWI Non-Resident Fellow Douglas Pryer writes in this new report that since the human dynamics underlying all group competitions are similar, all leaders can benefit from applying COIN theory to achieve significant organizational change.
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On April 8, the Modern War Institute invited Dr. Stathis Kalyvas of Yale and Dr. Laia Balcells of Duke to discuss the question: Is ISIS a group of revolutionary insurgents or a band of terrorists?
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MAJ Steve Ferenzi argues it is time to evaluate the post-9/11 Afghan state-building experiment and determine how best to influence its future trajectory in order to secure US national interests and achieve some measure of regional stability.
Read MoreBy Major Matt Cavanaugh
I’ve actually written quite a bit on ISIS to date, so it may be prudent for those that are unfamiliar with WarCouncil.org to visit some of these other short essays in order to provide some broader context:
Moreover, I’ve also written about Sun Tzu, most recently with respect to the War in Afghanistan:
“Teaching Sun Tzu can be fairly straightforward – and kind of tough. For example, what does he mean when he writes that ‘what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy?’ (Griffith translation, p. 77). Moreover, he writes that this should take precedence over other options – like attacking the enemy’s alliances, army, and cities (in order). That sounds great – sort of like telling a trader to “buy low, sell high” – but what does it actually look like?”
So how does the core of Sun Tzu’s strategic logic describe ISIS? How can we use Sun Tzu to understand ISIS strategic behavior?
Let’s start with American strategy. The President’s speech on ISIS on September 10, 2014 included language that US non-military strategy would include, among other things, efforts to counter ISIS’s “warped ideology.” More specifically, “It is America that has the capacity and the will to mobilize the world against terrorists.” So a key part of US strategy is informational. The US is doing this in two ways. First: denying ISIS legitimacy as a state actor, which can be seen in the seemingly infinite versions of what to call “them” (Daesh, ISIL, IS, Islamic “State,” and my favorite – “The Group That Calls Itself A State”). Second: the more of what the world sees of ISIS the more it will mobilize global public opinion against them.
Here’s how ISIS is running Sun Tzu’s counsel to attack the informational part of US strategy. The public executions target Westerners (they’re not doing this to everybody – they just let 350 Yazidis go) and are truly barbaric but simultaneously are the most violently theatrical way of demonstrating territorial control. Moreover, these hostage situations necessarily force states with captive citizens to negotiate with ISIS as if they were a state. Lastly, ISIS’s specific selection of journalists for targeting deters future reporting, which denies us part of our informational strategy (same playbook the Russians used in Crimea).
Read MoreImage (proudly) created by Matt Cavanaugh By Major Matt Cavanaugh Armies do not fight wars alone; entire societies fight wars. And information extracted from war shapes societal perceptions of costs and benefits of continuance...
Read MoreIn 1964, in the midst of the Supreme Court case Jacobellis v. Ohio, Justice Potter Stewart offered this description of pornography: “I know it when I see it.” Eleven years later, Gerald Seymour wrote in his novel Harry’s Game, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” In the years following, both phrases have been offered as platitudes to reassure analysts, policy makers, and the public alike that a clear definition of the word “terrorism” need not be extracted from the shifting historical and contemporary web of ambiguous violence: such a definition has been deemed either unnecessary or impossible by many. Consequently, terrorism has been conflated with a wide range of violent behavior, especially insurgencies. The word has become a propaganda tool, describing any kind of violence the user deems objectionable. Additionally, the accurate classification of conflicts as terrorism or insurgency is a precursor to developing an effective and corresponding response: counterterrorism (CT) or counterinsurgency (COIN).
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