MWI and Michael O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institution discuss the current state of the Army, the future for the Army and US land forces, and how junior leaders and security professionals can prepare.
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Major Steve Ferenzi argues that the United States must seriously consider the implications of al-Qaeda’s rebel governance approach for US national security.
Read MoreBy Captain John Goodwin
The value of information lies in its power to guide human action and, like anything of value, merits protection. Since the beginning of civilization, nation states sought to control information in the interest of security. Information as power manifests most clearly in the domain of military competition wherein knowledge of an adversary enables adventitious decision-making. Succinctly aphorized by Sun Zu (孫子) “know self know other, hundred battles, no peril” (知己知彼, 百戰不殆), the ancient military theorist recognized information as fundamental to military success. However, information security policy in the United States progressed haphazardly. Historical information security practices developed from various sources, and often lagged behind other nations. Prior to its era of global engagement, the United States faced a much lower risk from information compromise than it does today. This paper presents a brief history of American information security development to revel tendencies of belated implementation. As an ever evolving discipline, this reflection also highlights the adaptive character information security policy must maintain to remain effective.
On June 12, 1776, the Continental Congress formed “A Board of War and Ordnance” and with it an oath of secrecy. New government employees took the following oath:
I do solemnly swear, that I will not directly or indirectly divulge any manner or thing which shall come to my knowledge as (clerk, secretary) of the board of War and Ordnance for the United Colonies. . . So help me God.”[i]
Read MoreBy Captain Justin Lynch
Unpredictability plays an important role in every form of warfare. It emerges during any attempt to anticipate the future, an endeavor that often yields inaccurate results, sometimes wildly so. Given that many of these forecasts come from sound reasoning, experience, and deliberate attempts to gather empirical evidence, leaders can blame the resulting inaccuracies on an intrinsically unpredictable environment. Western militaries have tried to tackle this challenge. Technology has provided a vastly increased information flow to decision makers, creating the expectation that uncertainty and unpredictability will become less significant factors on the battlefield, and that military leaders can forsee the outcome of events. This attitude can lead to a dangerous, false sense of confidence. No matter what observation, communication or information systems militaries use, warfare will remain an inherently unpredictable endeavor. But if leaders attempt to comprehend its causes, structure and effects on operations, they can continue to try to minimize uncertainty while improving their ability to operate in an uncertain and unpredictable environment.
This paper will be part of a three part series about uncertainty and unpredictability in warfare. It will discuss them at the strategic level of war. The second paper will discuss the cause, structure, and effects of unpredictability at the operational level of counterinsurgencies by viewing states as complex adaptive systems. The third paper will discuss uncertainty and unpredictability at the platoon and company level, both for linear warfare and counterinsurgencies.
Read MoreBy Major Matt Cavanaugh
To best serve the nation, the Profession of Arms must nurture a culture of candor that enables good ideas and adaptation in order to successfully adjust to the rapidly changing circumstances of the modern world. To achieve this, we should practice moral courage by occasionally, respectfully expressing Divergent and “Red” Ideas.
The truth can be difficult to express and infinitely more challenging than a lie. As the venture capitalist Peter Thiel notes in his recent book, “Brilliant thinking is rare, but courage is in even shorter supply than genius.” There are fewer Sam Damon‘s than we might wish.
Moral courage is in short supply due to social pressures (not wanting to rock the boat amongst peers) as well as a strong sense of positional inferiority (i.e. “he’s a Colonel so he must know something I do not know”), both of which serve to clam up well-meaning individuals. The Profession of Arms, in particular, is uniquely susceptible to this lack of candor owing to two reasons: the high punishment in lives and resources for military mistakes and a relatively rigid senior-subordinate hierarchical structure.
To address this gap, the Army War College has published studies on “closing the culture chasm,” largely based on business reports on developing a working “culture of candor.” The Profession of Arms feels as though it must instill this characteristic somewhere in the arc of development as a reservoir of moral courage to safeguard against applying old solutions to new challenges. But we can look beyond the narrower Profession of Arms to the wider world to find support for this value.
There are some excellent personal codes on offer from three titans of our world. Marc Andreesson, the fantastically successful entrepreneur is known for his mantra: “strong opinions, weakly held.” Tony Judt, the essayist, once famously stated, “When the facts change, I change my mind.” And, the one appropriately held in highest esteem amongst members of the Profession of Arms, Sir Michael Howard wrote in his 1982 book, The Causes of Wars (p. 6): “I make no apology for any contradictions or inconsistencies that may be found in [these essays and lectures]. Those who do not change their minds in the course of a decade have probably stopped thinking altogether.” Andreesson, Judt, and Howard are instructive in that they give us cover to adjust our thinking as paradigms shift. Members of the Profession of Arms must recognize that warfare and our world is constantly changing and so should our estimates and appraisals.
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