Search Results for: ukraine

Epic Landpower Fail: Lack of Strategic Understanding

By Major Matt Cavanaugh

The US Army will not be very successful in the coming operating environment unless it develops a sense of strategic understanding in its officers (and senior noncommissioned officers).  For the purposes of this essay, strategic understanding is defined here as: awareness, comprehension, and ability to communicate broad purpose for the use of force and the relationship between tactical action and national policy.  Trends tell us two things that demand this characteristic: first, landpower is inherently attributional; second, the Regionally Aligned Forces model ensures that the American Army will go to more places, faster, in smaller numbers, than ever before.  Inadequately preparing for these landpower trends will lead to both institutional and individual epic fail.  

The Problem

Rosa Brooks recently conducted interviews at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait for the latest edition of Foreign Policy magazine (May/June 2014, p. 44).  Ironically, it was raining at the time, but that wasn’t the only striking thing about the discussions. Here’s a short selection from her experience:

“So what are you guys doing here?” I [Rosa Brooks] ask the young private next to me in line at the camp’s spacious Starbucks.  “I mean, in Kuwait. What’s your mission here?”

He offers a sheepish shrug.  “Got me, ma’am. That’s above my pay grade. I’m just trying to stay dry.”

“Ours not to wonder why, ours but to try and stay dry,” quips the lieutenant standing nearby, carefully maneuvering a lid onto his overflowing caramel latte.

This lieutenant’s response is a favorite in the officer corps, most likely due to its use by the infamous Corporal Oppum in Saving Private Ryan.  I’ve actually heard it several times from cadets in the Military Strategy class I teach. In this case, the paraphrase of Tennyson’s “The Charge of the Light Brigade” was just a bit off – a more exact quotation would have been: “Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die.” Unfortunately, this line is often employed to propagate a great lie – that “the reason why” does not (or should not) matter to the uniformed military.  Nothing could be further from the truth.

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Crimea: Psychological Warfare in Real Time

By Major Matt Cavanaugh

Emile Simpson wrote in his book – War From the Ground Up – about the psychological aspect to warfare (p. 35):

“War is a competition to impose meaning on people, as much emotional as rational, in which one’s enemy is usually the key target audience. Defeat is not a ‘verdict’ handed out by an independent arbitrator of war; defeat is a perceived state which typically is violently forced (or successfully threatened) by one side upon the other.”

In a forthcoming paper for Military Review, I took a hack at defining this tricky psychological battlefield relationship/space – calling it the “human environment” (*as opposed to “domain,” which I prefer, but more on that another time).   I defined the human environment as “the sum of physical, psychological, cultural, and social interactions between strategically-relevant populations and operational military forces in a particular war or conflict.”

Either way one chooses to term it, we’re seeing this play out at the last Ukrainian military garrisons in Crimea –  in particular Belbek Air Base.  The Russians surrounded, and eventually took, the base.  Interviews provide a glimpse of the decision forced upon the trapped troops.  

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War Council: Crisis in Crimea – Military Strategic Considerations

**NOTE: What follows are remarks from the War Council panel on the “Crisis in Crimea” on March 7, 2014.

By Major Matt Cavanaugh

In 1939, Churchill quipped, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”

Winston wouldn’t – but I feel like I owe it to you and the Profession to try.  So here goes.

We should note at the outset, strategy is inherently adversarial – which makes it seem black/white or binary – reality is like a Rubik’s cube, multifaceted shifting mosaic.  With only seven minutes to speak I’ll necessarily have to present simplifications.

 Policy/Strategy – what do they want and how will they get there?

Russia

-So far, Putin has stated that he does not intend on annexing Crimea (which may change in light of the local Crimean Parliament vote – and subject to domestic Russian politics). It seems that his policy objective there is at least designed to influence and intimidate the new government.  

-His strategy for doing so is to use the threat of military force – recent reporting puts his troop strength somewhere between 16,000 and 20,000.  He’s cleverly sunk one of his own ships to create a non-violent blockade of the local Ukrainian naval forces.

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War Council: Crisis in Crimea – Introduction

**NOTE: What follows is the set of introductory remarks from the War Council panel on the “Crisis in Crimea” on March 7, 2014.

By Captain Andrew Betson

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  On behalf of the Defense and Strategic Studies Program, the Department of Military Instruction, and our panelists, welcome to the third DSS War Council, “Crisis in Crimea.”  Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union recently stated, “I believe that nobody can understand the likely outcomes of what is happening unless they bear in mind the historical, geographic, political and psychological factors at play in these dramatic events.”  We have gathered this War Council for both an academic and professional purpose – to discuss American strategic options in reaction to these dramatic events, the second example of significant strong arm diplomacy by Russia is less than 6 years. 

These things are hard to predict.  In “Foreign Policy’s” 2013 Failed States Index, in which they rank the strength of the world’s countries through categories such as Demographic Pressures, Human Flight, Human Rights, and Public Services, Ukraine scored 117, between Jamaica and Malaysia.  She was less than ten spots behind Brazil, it ranked higher than South Africa by four, and Russia by 37.  Nonetheless, about three months ago, pro-Western activists set out into Kiev Independence Square and across Ukraine in reaction to the now-ousted President Yanukovych’s rapprochement with Russia.

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Security Paradoxes: Environment and Spending

By Major Matt Cavanaugh

This has been a really busy week – we’re sponsoring a panel on Ukraine tomorrow – which means that I’ll be posting remarks over the weekend.  So it’s not all bad: a slow week this week means that there will be fresh analysis and commentary for you this coming week!

Security Paradox #1: Environment

But for now, I’d like to call attention to a public address from a couple years ago by the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey.  

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