Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has gone back to basics and its raison d’etre of collective defense. That doesn’t mean, however, that the alliance can afford to neglect its commitment to dealing with emerging incidents and crises before they devolve into bloody military conflicts. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. Chris Cavoli recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “NATO is not a one problem alliance.”

Even as its top priority remains deterring and defending against Russian irredentism, failing to maintain its crisis management capabilities presents its own security risks. NATO should seek to bolster its crisis management efforts through targeted prevention, enhanced readiness, and strategic partnerships to address security threats worldwide.

The definition of NATO crisis management has evolved over the years. In the 1990s and 2000s, it was primarily associated with out-of-area peacekeeping and stabilization operations. Today, the need for crisis management operations can arise from a broad range of events— from military aggression to humanitarian disasters to technological disruptions. The lines between Article 5 defense missions and crisis management are becoming blurrier—so-called hybrid warfare that exploits the gray area between peace and war are a case in point—which means NATO cannot be optimally prepared for either mission without being prepared for both.

NATO is trying to adapt for future contingencies. Rather than managing crises as they arise, the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept focuses on preventing and responding to crises that “have the potential to affect Allied security” and the recent 2024 Summit Declaration reiterates this objective. This approach is aimed at ensuring that NATO can better maintain regional stability by preventing adversaries from exploiting minor incidents to promote instability for geopolitical gain.

Along with the alliance’s new strategic documents, force and capability changes are being made to adapt to an environment in which crises are the norm, not the exception. NATO unveiled a new force model at the 2022 Madrid Summit to promote a heightened state of readiness and adaptability to address emerging crises before they metastasize.

The force model is underpinned by “high readiness forces across domains” included in a new Allied Response Force, consisting of a planned five hundred thousand troops, and supports the alliance’s new Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area. The goal is to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence posture and crisis management capabilities without compromising overall readiness.

What does this mean for NATO operationally? In the near term, active crisis management missions will likely remain operational albeit at limited levels compared to past efforts such as the International Security Assistance Force, which conducted military training and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. Future efforts should draw on existing NATO initiatives that focus on the crisis prevention side of crisis management.

A key example of this is the Kosovo Force, active since the violence in the Balkans in 1999 and engaged in developing local security organizations for Kosovo. Another would be the broadening of the NATO Mission in Iraq, a noncombat advisory and capacity-building mission aimed at helping Iraq build better security institutions to stabilize the country and combat terrorism. While some may view these efforts as security cooperation and institution building rather than crisis management, both missions aim to foster stability in their respective host countries to diffuse crises before they require larger intervention.

NATO’s crisis management operations also extend to the maritime domain with the alliance’s Standing Naval Forces, Operation Sea Guardian, and the Aegean Activity. The Baltic Air Policing mission in Europe and ongoing cooperation with the African Union also illustrate NATO’s comprehensive focus on security. These areas, while becoming more limited in relation to collective defense efforts, are like muscles the alliance has effectively trained in the past twenty years, and which it will likely continue to exercise.

New crisis management missions outside NATO territory remain unlikely, as the scars of Afghanistan and worsening security situations in the Middle East and the Sahel may limit engagement in these regions, even as terrorism remains a key threat. This makes preventing crises before they occur even more important. Rather, the focus in NATO’s south will likely be primarily on dialogue, partnership building, training, and security cooperation on shared issues while limiting on-the-ground military engagement, as recent operational and political efforts suggest.

Given this state of play, what should NATO do? In bolstering crisis management, NATO’s interaction with other multilateral organizations is crucial. Collaborating with entities such as the European Union, the United Nations, and regional organizations like the African Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) can enhance the collective ability to respond to complex and emerging crises. This collaboration should include political, civilian, and military tools.

NATO cooperation with the United Nations also should focus on sharing lessons learned, best practices, and standards, including in key areas like women, peace, and security and civilian protection. In addition, NATO should consider pursuing strategic partnerships even with subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa. Joint exercises, shared intelligence, and coordinated response plans with these subregional partnerships could be productive. With the European Union, the focus can be on operational coordination in crisis management efforts and resource sharing, while with the African Union, focus on issues such as capacity building and training can elevate the substantive nature of the partnership.

Finally, NATO’s collaboration with OSCE can provide a platform for dialogue and conflict resolution in areas where military intervention could be avoided given OSCE’s complementary expertise in in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.

As the alliance transitions to its new Allied Response Force model, it should continue the development of highly ready forces that can respond to fight both conventional and unconventional crises. On the force development side, the focus should be on training and exercises, especially no-notice exercises, to ensure an alliance-wide standard of readiness exists for crisis contingencies.

Most importantly, allies should make a purposeful effort to redefine crisis management in a changing geopolitical environment. The annual review of the NATO Crisis Response System should include an emphasis on more prevention activities, integrating lessons learned in crisis management from contexts such as Ukraine or counter-ISIS efforts, while anticipating future crisis scenarios. This should be coupled with a much-needed update to allied joint publications on crisis response operations.

Insecurity and fragility in neighboring countries that fuel migration and terrorism or attacks on critical infrastructure, whether on allied territory or not, all have the potential to impact alliance members’ security without crossing into collective defense scenarios. Bolstering NATO exercise slates to work through more robust and realistic contingencies and understanding potential scenarios for action can help NATO be more prepared.

An enhanced commitment to crisis management for a new age of great power rivalry could better position NATO to promote stability by preventing emerging crises from becoming full-blown military conflicts.

Paul Schaffner is a policy analyst at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution, who focuses US grand strategy, alliance building, and transatlantic security.

Anca Agachi is a (defense) policy analyst at RAND with expertise in NATO’s adaptation and transformation and emerging threats.

Jack Lashendock is a policy analyst at RAND specializing in global governance and multilateralism.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of RAND, the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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