Repacking Pandora’s Box: Managing the Dangers of Weapons Proliferation in Postconflict Ukraine
In the understandable rush to equip Ukraine to defend its sovereignty, the West has flooded the...
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Douglas Livermore and Erin K. McFee | 05.31.22 | Irregular Warfare Initiative
In the understandable rush to equip Ukraine to defend its sovereignty, the West has flooded the...
Read MoreDouglas Livermore | 04.13.21 | Commentary & Analysis
Throughout the nearly two decades of America’s post-9/11 wars, most Americans have been largely...
Read MoreDouglas Livermore | 01.16.14 | Commentary & Analysis
In An Army at Dawn, acclaimed author Rick Atkinson chronicles the initial battles of the U.S. Army waged in late 1942 and early 1943 against German, Italian, and Vichy French forces across North Africa. A recurring theme throughout Atkinson’s work is the lack of preparation prevalent in the U.S. Army to wage modern, combined arms warfare against the battle-hardened German “Afrika Korps”, particularly as evidenced by the crushing blows inflicted on the American forces at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. The bloody toll paid by the U.S. Army in 1943, in which the American forces alone suffered more than five times the losses in men and equipment as compared to the Germans, was a direct result of the failure of the Americans to encourage innovation and “unconventional” development during the interwar period of 1919-1939. While other nations, particularly those who had “lost” World War II (most notably Germany), undertook exceptional reforms to modernize their militaries, the U.S. stifled progress and discouraged pioneering leaders to such an extent that many chose to leave the service or were forced out. As a result, the U.S. entered into World War II with vastly inferior equipment, doctrine, and training.
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