In the global battle for hearts and minds, sophisticated networks of disinformation pose a serious threat to free societies and their aspirations for a better future. China, Russia, and Iran have funded a global web of news sites, podcasters, media platforms, and influencers to support authoritarianism and perpetuate narratives of Western corruption and decline. As a result, political fringes have gone mainstream, leading to the years-long persistence of patently false narratives about the decisions and policies of democratic states. Disinformation, consisting of intentionally false content, has fostered a broader cesspool of misinformation spread by unwitting actors. If the information space continues to be dominated by America’s adversaries and their partners, nearly all the domestic and foreign policy challenges facing the United States today will likely persist or worsen.
Polls of citizens in free countries repeatedly show that narratives rooted in disinformation are succeeding. A third of Americans do not believe the media should be able to report news without state censorship. Nearly one in five believe the NATO alliance is no longer necessary. And 37 percent do not support the provision of US aid to for the economic development of developing states. At the core of each of these beliefs and many others are disinformation campaigns that overstate the dangers of free speech, distort imbalances among partners in US-led alliances, and misrepresent the costs and benefits of US foreign aid initiatives. Without a concerted effort to combat these harmful narratives, the United States risks losing the global information war, which will have deleterious effects on its ability to ensure a stable, prosperous, and rules-based global order.
To maintain and expand the positive influence of the free world on its own citizens and those in authoritarian and partly free societies, the United States and its partners must play an active role in combating the disinformation tropes perpetrated by its adversaries. There is no silver bullet that will guarantee victory in the information battle, but there are four organizing principles that can increase the chance of success.
The first is the need to ensure fact-based narratives are clearly and frequently expressed to frame global developments in an accurate manner favorable to the United States and its partners. Often, earnest efforts to correct the record are restrained by poor messaging and muddled public responses. The ties between Moscow and Beijing, for instance, are often heralded by both states as a mutually beneficial partnership among equals. The reality of Russia’s status as a junior partner with an outsized reliance on its neighbor is not raised by the United States and partners often enough. Concerted international coordination is necessary to call out Chinese, Russian, and Iranian narratives and change public perceptions.
Secondly, free societies must harness tools already in existence to expand access to their perspectives. Through press offices, social media accounts, and international gatherings, leaders can elevate their viewpoints above the noise of adversarial misinformation campaigns. Government-owned legacy media, such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Liberty / Radio Europe, have lost funding at a time when some authoritarian systems are experiencing a period of weakness. Russia’s abandonment of the Assad regime in Syria is one of many recent examples of a geopolitical defeat that has been underutilized by the United States in the international court of public opinion.
Public policies must be developed to intentionally limit the spread of demonstrably false information. Fortunately, there is a growing field of research on the psychology of misinformation to aid in this effort. A 2022 UK-based study found that explaining how false news is structured—a tactic called “prebunking”—has been shown to inoculate some media consumers from believing and sharing misinformation when they see it. Likewise, reminding viewers to consider whether a headline was accurate has been shown to increase the likelihood that they will not share misinformation with others, thereby constraining the spread of false narratives. Another recent study found that explaining the concept of active open-mindedness helps individuals discern misinformation and conspiracy theories. A bipartisan effort to encourage social media companies to implement the guidance being developed in academia would likely help contain the lies that have roiled America’s political landscape.
Lastly, the information battle must not seek to only counter negative depictions of America and its allies. While historical errors by the West must be acknowledged, they need to be considered alongside the great successes of the free world over the past century. Among them are the post–World War II rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan, the democratization of Japan, and the successful political and economic integration of former communist states in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. There have also been recent accomplishments that have not received the recognition they deserve; President George W. Bush’s successes in reducing HIV in Africa and Operation Warp Speed’s production and donation of COVID-19 vaccines in record time offer two instances from this century that exemplify the free world’s capacity and willingness to work for the common good.
Winning the information war requires a stalwart defense of the past and present. A bipartisan effort to counter the disinformation that has inflamed and distorted debate in democratic societies would aid in the pursuit of sound policy, both foreign and domestic. Moreover, by reducing a key irritant in our polity, a bold endeavor to actively present the truth would aid in the resumption of good-faith civil discourse across the United States.
Artur Kalandarov studied misinformation narratives at Stanford’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies. He has previously been published in Defense One, Newsweek, The National Interest, RealClearDefense, and The Hill. Artur is a senior associate at The Cohen Group, where he advises companies on their operations in Eastern Europe. His views do not necessarily reflect those of his firm.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.