At 7:30 pm local time on October 1, the Islamic Republic of Iran finally launched the retaliation strike against Israel that Tehran’s Hezbollah proxies have been requesting (with increasing urgency) for the past month. The days and weeks to come will provide greater clarity on the details of the Israeli air defense operation and if it was as massively successful as the defense against a large-scale Iranian drone and missile attack in April. The effectiveness of the bombardment against Israeli miliary targets and air bases, which Iran claimed was the primary aim, will have to be assessed after the Israeli response. For now, three initial takeaways stand out.
Management of Interceptor Stockpiles
It is a truism in the world of missile defense that the interceptor designed to take out an incoming rocket or missile will always be more expensive and sophisticated than its target. The supply bottleneck for the Israelis and their continued defense is the production of interceptors to handle the medium-range ballistic missiles being launched from Iran proper. A key thing to watch for in this strange dance between lethal rivals is the constant calculus shrouded in the fog of war between estimated interceptors on hand for the Israelis and estimated missiles in the hands of Iran. Each side knows its own strength but not the opponent’s, making the next stage of the missile war resemble a high-stakes poker match.
Spectacular footage of the Iranian attack over Tel Aviv shows how few of the missiles were intercepted by Israeli air defense as they rained down in a series of waves over forty-five minutes. Viewers can see how the Iranian missiles all appear to be traveling in a steady trajectory at the same speed (not tumbling) and impact in a general target area—all indicators that they were not intercepted. Given Israel’s operational parameters and its preference for intercepting practically everything that threatens a populated area, let alone its most important economic center, concern about stockpiles appear to have influenced Israeli decision making. Israel has expended hundreds of interceptors from the short-range Iron Dome as well as David’s Sling, which protects against rockets, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles. While the Arrow system, which is designed to defend against the type of medium-range ballistic missile Iran fired this week, has been used less frequently over the past year, it played a key role in the defense against the April attack and Houthi missiles launched from Yemen. Even if Arrow stockpiles are healthier than those of other air defense systems, uncertainty about how many missiles Iran would launch needs to be accounted for.
The seeming reluctance to engage the dozens missiles impacting downtown Tel Aviv is a strong indicator that the Israeli air defense is operating on low missile protocol (in NATO brevity code, “Browning”; in informal air defense parlance, “lomo”). This includes choosing to selectively not engage incoming missiles predicted to hit relatively low-value strategic targets to save them for more important locations. According to reports, the Israelis intercepted around 50 percent of the incoming tracks, as opposed to over 95 percent during the April attack. The Israelis are keenly aware of how many interceptors they have and how many ballistic missiles the Iranians probably have—and will take actions to preserve their stockpile as best they can.
Low-Notice Ballistic Missile Attacks
Unlike Iran’s previous two direct conventional attacks, against the US forces in Iraq in 2020 and against Israel in April, this attack occurred with a minimum of forewarning, with only about seven hours between the United States and Israel announcing an attack was imminent and the first missiles being launched. This warning was passed on to the public only about two hours before the attack. Moreover, Tehran learned a critical lesson about the impotence of slow-flying cruise missiles and drones transiting over one thousand kilometers of hostile airspace. This time, Iran dispensed with the useless drone cannon fodder and cruise missiles and appear to only have utilized domestically produced liquid-fueled medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), with the high volume of tracks and scattershot accuracy strongly indicating a mix of MRBMs including the Shahab-3 and likely its variants, the Ghadr-110H and the Emad. Keep in mind, it takes time for liquid-fueled missiles such as Iran’s MRBMs to fuel up and prepare for launch, not counting their transit to launch sites. Solid-fueled missiles do not have to be fueled before use, allowing for greater surprise upon launch.
Passive Defense Against Air Attack
Air defense is about more than shooting incoming munitions or aircraft. Successful civil and military defense must be paired with an alert and shelter plan designed for the worst-case scenarios. In a true saturation attack such as this one, some of the missiles are going to get through, and some of them will impact in populated areas. It is essential to remember the less sexy world of passive defense against bombardment, with hardened shelters being no less important than multimillion-dollar kinetic kill interceptors. The Israelis trust in the low accuracy of Iranian missiles and their own proven alert and shelter system to prevent civilian casualties, something that proved extremely effective during the April attack and again this week. The resiliency of the local population is an intangible but essential part of this equation.
The most likely following course of action will be an Israeli strike against the Iranian nuclear program, something that Iranian air defense will be completely incapable of preventing. Iran’s international reputation is on the line, and its proxies and partners (to say nothing of its discontented populace) are looking for more out of Tehran than words, red flags, and ineffective salvos. Iran’s vast advantage in manpower is rendered useless by its distance from its primary geopolitical foe and inability to close with the Israelis. Like an outside boxer against an inside fighter, the Israelis will continue to have the advantage as long as they keep their enemies at range. When the next engagement of this oddly theatrical missile war comes, it will once again be a numbers game, interceptors versus incoming missiles.
Maj. Peter Mitchell is a strategist, air defense expert, West Point instructor, and Modern War Institute contributor. You can follow him on X @peternmitchell.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Israel Defense Forces