For many in the United States, the terrorist attack conducted by Hamas on October 7, 2023, was a reminder that the threat of terrorism has not dissipated despite decades of war. Many felt anew the fury resulting from an armed attack upon civilians. As the United States did after the terrorist attack of 9/11, Israel reacted immediately and with overwhelming force against an asymmetric threat hiding among a population of civilians. According to the Israeli military, its forces have achieved tactical success in Gaza by reportedly eliminating many Hamas leaders. However, this rapid operational success has been achieved at significant risk to the strategic national interests of Israel. Reports conflict regarding the number of civilians killed, but the White House confirmed the number of civilians killed since October 7 exceed sixteen thousand. According to the United Nations, the total number of Palestinians killed exceeds thirty-four thousand. Multiple sources also allege human rights violations against Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the West Bank. Yet the rapid tactical success of the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza, measured by the reported number of terrorists killed, prevents Israeli leadership from recognizing the strategic hazard resulting from negative public perception of equivalent response, military necessity, and acceptance of collateral damage.
During America’s post-9/11 wars, the US military experienced a similar set of dynamics. After early mistakes, US forces refined their targeting processes and calculation of military necessity and mitigation of collateral damage, making improvements over years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Coalition commanders learned through bitter experience that anything less than surgical application of force against combatants resulted not only in lost credibility with the public (measured by participation in development initiatives, voting, and reporting of Taliban activity), but the creation of new resistance among the harmed communities. It is in Israel’s strategic interest—and at this juncture, because Israel is considered a strategic American partner, also that of the United States—to apply the lessons that the US military learned late during its conflict in Afghanistan. Effective counterterrorism requires the application of an unwavering and objective balance of military necessity against the absolute minimum possible collateral damage to civilians.
All nations are required to conduct war in accordance with international law, including the Geneva Conventions and the law of armed conflict. These standards apply even when combating terrorist groups or adversaries that are not signatories to the Geneva Conventions, and the legitimacy of the state will be measured by the international community by how the state wages war—even when opponents do not. These laws establish fundamental principles for the humane treatment of civilians, prisoners of war, and combatants, as well as guidelines for the proportionate use of force and the protection of civilian infrastructure. Upholding these laws is essential to minimize civilian casualties and prevent unnecessary suffering during armed conflicts. Failure to wage war within the limits of the law of armed conflict will reduce the perceived legitimacy of combatants, and in an interconnected world perception is as important as reality. Russia’s economy since its invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that a country may survive under international sanctions and trade restrictions but will struggle to thrive. Sanctions limit available trade partners and reduce standing within those relationships.
The terrorist attack committed by agents of Hamas on October 7 was immediately condemned internationally by all but the most radical observers. Figure 1 below highlights the relationship between the intensity of violence of an action and the appropriate intensity of a military response to that action. The red circle approximates the public perception of the Hamas attack immediately after the attack. The relatively low level of violence by Hamas during the weeks preceding the October 7 attack, coupled with the violence of the attack and choice of targets, suggests a plot high on the Y axis denoting level of violence, and left of center on the X axis (which denotes time). Lack of preceding violence increased the perception of suddenness of violence despite long-stated objections to the living conditions of Palestinians in Israel and the aggressive acts against Palestinians by Jewish settlers. The violence committed by Hamas on that day was unannounced, unexpected, and well above the perceived level of acceptable response to Israel’s actions in Gaza and the West Bank for the international audience. This attack was above the perceived level of violence that an observer would consider appropriate within the conflict’s framework.
The initial response to the attack by the Israeli military was immediate and overwhelming, as was its response to previous provocations. It has exceeded even the high degree of violence Hamas sought to provoke, which the group hoped would be seen as beyond the elevated threshold of acceptable violence. By allegedly hiding its headquarters and supply positions in hospitals and other civilian facilities Hamas ensured that Israeli responses would be executed in an environment with the highest potential for collateral damage to Palestinian noncombatants. Early Israeli military attacks upon Hamas units and facilities resulted in civilian casualties, only partially offset by international recognition that the colocation of fighters, weapons, or headquarters in targets that would normally be on the restricted fire list removed that protected status. The reports, photos, and videos of significant casualties among women and children transmitted via multiple media venues without offsetting evidence detailing the military necessity of lethal action against specific target locations supported the narrative that the response by the Israeli military did not appropriately balance support to military objectives against potential resulting collateral damage. The resulting perception of the level of violence in the Israel Defense Forces’ response to the provocation by Hamas is demonstrably above the acceptable threshold for many international observers, represented in Figure 2 below. Initial response is graphed high on the Y axis to denote the popular perception of the level of violence applied, and slightly right on the X axis to denote the short passage of time between the attack and Israel’s response. The quick response time by Israel demonstrates a deterrent willingness to respond to provocation—important in competition with terrorist organizations—but the quick response also prevents observers from growing accustomed to seeing collateral damage incurred during military operations.
Early United States military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan also resulted in collateral damage and death to noncombatants. The dearth of privately owned cameras among the population in both countries then partially isolated the public from the daily conflicts, absent journalists. The lack of immediate public response to collateral damage may have encouraged commanders to accept greater levels of risk than were common to operations later in the conflicts. Force protection objectives encouraged commanders early in the conflicts to apply the maximum appropriate lethal force to reduce threats to the unit and the public. Commanders deployed later to both conflicts discovered that many anti-Iraq forces and Taliban fighters had been mobilized based on deaths and injuries of relatives and close personal contacts and noncombatants killed during military operations. They also discovered that the spread of digital cameras, ubiquitous video recording made possible through smartphones, and cellular internet access in remote areas support the broadcast of collateral damage against civilians and resulting suffering in real time and full color. Availability bias supports the terrorist or insurgent, as the public does not see the risk mitigation or damage calculation implanted during planning. It is worth noting, even if modern technology facilitates faster public awareness and response, the primary reason for adhering to the law of armed conflict is the inherent value of these principles in promoting humane treatment and limiting the horrors of war. Public scrutiny can reinforce compliance, but the core obligation to follow these laws exists independently of whether the world is watching.
By 2018, US forces operating in Afghanistan had recognized the impact of real-time communication on the battlefield and had developed robust procedures to balance the military necessity of identified targets against potential collateral damage, with calculations completed in conjunction with coalition partners to maximize transparency (within classification limits). This process drastically slowed the pace of operations and increased intelligence requirements to clear lethal fires, allowing many observed threat actors to escape immediate interdiction. One of the authors participated in a four-day target observation clearance in 2018, employing multiple observation systems to count individual noncombatants near a proposed target. Destruction of this target would have resulted in killing hundreds of terrorists, but clearance of fires was contingent upon estimated collateral damage less than a specified number (this number was expressed in a single digit). As during many other planned operations during 2018, these conditions were not met, and fires never cleared. While not a desirable tactical outcome in this case, US senior commanders had learned that public anger and lost credibility due to collateral damage imposed a greater threat to strategic success than the escape of even hundreds of identified terrorists, and that discretion allowed units to engage targets at a time more advantageous to the mission. This discretion, in conjunction with standing procedures for providing immediate medical aid to injured civilians (to include evacuation to a hospital and lodging for family members to accompany the casualties during treatment), had reduced the significance of collateral damage as a narrative to allow other variables to dominate discussion.
It would be natural if the historical treatment of Jews as a people and the constant threat to Israel as a nation contributes to something of a bunker mentality, where the immediacy of a demonstrated threat biases leaders toward an overwhelming response to ensure survival above other concerns. The attack by Hamas on October 7 was intended to exploit this bias, provoking Israel into a response that would be viewed as disproportionate by those that do not perceive the threat an existential one.
Given the significance of Israel as a strategic ally in the region, the United States military and civilian leadership must assist Israel in refining its targeting process and assessment of military necessity against collateral damage based on the methods employed in the later years of the conflict in Afghanistan. This assistance is unlikely to be accepted willingly. Like the United States after 9/11, stamping out terrorist threats became a national strategic priority, with all else a distraction. Calls to restrict aid to Israel have often been presented as binary, conditioning US aid to Israel upon a ceasefire or restrictions against specific operations. In response, critics express skepticism that a terrorist group like Hamas will observe a ceasefire and allege that conditioning aid to a strategic regional ally is not only poor policy, but antisemitic and a poor way to support a national victim of terrorism given that many Western nations provided unwavering support for the United States after 9/11. The United States might have benefited early after 9/11 had US military forces had access to a partner with experience in minimizing collateral damage during urban operations. Conditioning lethal aid to the application of a deliberate clearance-of-fires procedure—with minimal and clearly defined levels of collateral damage—is not anti-Israel. On the contrary, acceptance of such a condition would help Israel stop the hemorrhage of civilian blood and Israel’s legitimacy as a state with it. Such a condition would at least begin to counter the narrative of US complicity in collateral damage.
Already multiple sources have alleged human rights abuses by the Israeli military, particularly in relation to its actions in the occupied territories and during military operations such as those in Gaza. These allegations include excessive use of force, targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, starvation as a weapon or war, and restrictions on humanitarian access. The barbarity of war often results in inappropriate actions by even the most disciplined of forces. The more risk of overall collateral damage a commander accepts, the greater the potential for even an unsanctioned action to undermine the legitimacy of the operation to the global community. International public perception of the Israeli military has been further eroded by recent operations in Rafah, a location Israel had designated as a haven for Palestinian civilians. Images have emerged of an Israeli airstrike on a tent camp in Rafah, set up for Palestinians who had been forcibly displaced. Reports indicate that women and children comprised the majority of the forty-five casualties in the assault. Even more recently, while the return of four Israeli hostages was undoubtedly a relief, it came at a considerable expense. The operation to rescue them flagrantly breached the principles of the law of armed conflict, notably regarding proportionality. It remains untenable within any legal framework to argue that the salvation of four hostages justifies the death of over two hundred Palestinian civilian lives, thus exacerbating negative global perception of Israel. The disconnect between global public perception and public opinion among Israelis appears to be only growing. According to a recent Pew Research Center survey conducted by Israelis in Israel, when asked about their nation’s military intervention against Hamas in Gaza, around 40 percent of Israelis believe that it has been appropriately executed, while an additional 34 percent believe it has fallen short.
To be clear, the threat to Israel is real. Hamas has demonstrated resilience and a willingness to endure the suffering of Gazans to maintain its grip on power, regardless of the human toll. While Hamas has expressed some willingness to negotiate a hostage exchange for Palestinian prisoners, it has shown no inclination toward complete surrender. Offering lethal aid in conjunction with expertise and support to a clearance-of-fires process that prioritizes long-term sustainment of credibility over perceived short-term tactical success is not demanding a ceasefire. If Israel wants to continue to pursue the perpetrators of the attack of October 7, it must be at a pace and through a process that protects Israel’s legitimacy as a democratic state from the harm resulting from excessive collateral damage. So far, Israel has neither eliminated the threat of Hamas nor demonstrated discriminatory fires as a lawful combatant in the way it has conducted operations.
The Israeli military does not have the time to independently refine a clearance-of-fires process like that eventually developed by the US military, especially while fighting under the bias toward action resulting from the perception of immediate threat. Through its significant materiel and expert support to Israel, the United States can help the Israeli military prioritize the protection of civilians and respect for human rights in its military operations at a level necessary to ensure the long-term legitimacy of Israel as a nation and the United States, if it wants to continue as a strategic partner. Despite Israel’s relentless attacks, Hamas has demonstrated resilience and a willingness to endure the suffering of Gazans to maintain its grip on power, regardless of the human toll. If Israel persists with its current pace in combating Hamas, it might think it can stand a chance of effectively eliminating both ordinary members and key leaders within the group. However, this success could come at a significant cost to the country’s future stability, especially if the rate of Palestinian civilian casualties remains high, making it a Pyrrhic victory in the end.
Amina Kator-Mubarez is a faculty research associate in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Chad Machiela is a retired US Army Special Forces warrant officer with more than thirty-six years of experience working in the US Indo-Pacific, Central, Africa, and European Command areas of responsibility. Chad is now a faculty research associate in the Common Operational Research Environment Laboratory at the Naval Postgraduate School.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: WAFA
