Jonathan Schroden, US Counterterrorism Operations in Afghanistan: Jackpots, Dry Holes, and Collateral Damage (Bloomsbury, 2026)


America’s war in Afghanistan was divided in two. Conventional forces operated mainly during the day, implementing an ever-shifting strategy: clearing villages, conducting counterinsurgency alongside a partner force, and providing overwatch for Afghan forces. At the same time, special operations forces operated often at night, executing raids, capturing insurgent leaders, and targeting cells. Dr. Jonathan Schroden’s new book, US Counterterrorism Operations in Afghanistan: Jackpots, Dry Holes and Collateral Damage, makes the war’s once-hazy dichotomy clear.

Where previous works focused on the war’s strategic direction, policymaking, a particular province, or a specific organization like the Taliban—such as Carter Malkasian’s authoritative history of the conflict or Wesley Morgan’s profile of a single valley—Schroden trains his focus on special operations and counterterrorism actions. His treatment of counterterrorism in Afghanistan deftly complements these earlier accounts. With academic rigor, this book supplements, rather than supplants, the Afghan war canon.

The counterterrorism template Schroden dissects has not been retired; it has been refined, amplified, and intensified. His account of Afghanistan shows why that should worry us: A model built to win the night mistook tactical success for strategy.

Schroden’s most meaningful contribution is describing how and why tactical success failed to produce operational and strategic success. The much-lauded success of the F3EAD targeting cycle—find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate —rested on a set of shaky assumptions, and its effects varied widely depending on the enemy group targeted. Building on successes against al-Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliates, the campaign in Afghanistan opened the aperture to target al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and later Islamic State–Khorasan Province. The targeting model worked with varying degrees of success against these groups. The homegrown Taliban fared much better than the outside al-Qaeda fighters, for example, given the Taliban ability to blend into the local populace.

The assumptions underpinning F3EAD were tied to effects-based operations. Viewing al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Taliban as closed systems meant that targeted counterterrorism operations could theoretically cripple those organizations. Coupled with efforts to accelerate special operations forces’ decision-making to outpace the enemy’s decision-making cycle, F3EAD held that relentless strikes and cascading effects would collapse terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan.

However, Schroden points out two fatal flaws in these assumptions. First, F3EAD failed to distinguish between physical networks and human networks; physical networks remain bound to physics, but human networks morph in ways that are often indiscernible or unpredictable. Second, F3EAD suffered from a narrow focus on enemy networks, ignoring the surrounding mosaic of Afghan social networks. Viewing the Taliban as a series of levers and pulleys rather than men of flesh and bone reveals an alarming lack of cultural and tactical understanding. Heightened operational tempo served as a temporary balm, but left underlying conditions unaddressed.

F3EAD created its own logic and incentive structure. Each target identified and struck produced a tangible result, one measured, briefed, and then rewarded. The number of missions became the only reliable metric in the flood of suspect data and faulty reporting. Fast forward to today and nascent technology, including machine learning, is set to make the targeting machine faster and more lethal without resolving the underlying problem: Knowing the location of a human in a network does not equate to understanding the layered system the human resides in. Did tactical successes simply fail to produce strategic progress, or did they actually obscure our ability to see that we weren’t making progress?

Counterterrorism operations resulted in civilian casualties, undermining the narrative of Afghan government legitimacy. As a result, Afghan civilians became reluctant to trust and partner with Afghan and US forces. The government and its American backers, in effect, asked Afghans to choose sides in the midst of violence. Civilian casualties caused by US service members and abuse perpetrated by Afghan forces did not determine the war’s outcome, but they undercut the political legitimacy that the broader campaign required. Judging only an enemy network ignores the cascading effects of successful and unsuccessful raids.

F3EAD also obscured the true level of independent capacity of the Afghan government and its military, for whom it served as a sort of training wheels. The raids and strikes created a false sense of progress, even though the catastrophic collapse after the August 2021 withdrawal made apparent that Afghan institutions could not stand on their own. Schroden’s study of special operations forces’ actions, often billed as in service to operational and military objectives, shows that they frequently undermined the achievement of broader strategic aims. The counterterrorism methods left observers impressed, but the achievement of lasting military objectives proved elusive.

The failure to secure strategic objectives in Afghanistan left a narrative void. In the absence of a clear formula that accounts for not only the ultimate outcome but also what went well and what did not, it becomes easy to appreciate tactical success for its own sake. Tactically successful special operations missions, then, risk being too heavily celebrated—absent the important contextual caveat that they did little or nothing to generate strategic success. And if high-tech, intelligence-driven operations linger in the American public’s collective memory as the most successful approach to have emerged in the counterterrorism context of Afghanistan, why not port that approach to other operational contexts?

The January raid to capture Nicolás Maduro rests on the same core beliefs as the Afghanistan counterterrorism operations: an F3EAD cycle, backed by superior intelligence and expanded authorities, could produce decisive political effects. The template was then extended to the opening days of Operation Epic Fury. However, Iran studied two decades of conflict to its east and west. Pnina Shuker and Andrew Milburn in War on the Rocks describe how the Iranian regime instituted a “mosaic defense,” using “a decentralized command structure designed to survive exactly the kind of decapitation strikes that opened this war.” The Iranian regime witnessed F3EAD’s devastating effects and now fights America and Israel on its own terms. They add, “Tehran moved the contest to terrain its adversaries were not equipped to contest: maritime coercion, economic disruption, information dominance, and political will.” This adaptation exposes a structural limit of the F3EAD model: It is most effective against networks that can be mapped and collapsed, and far less decisive against systems designed to absorb decapitation and shift the contest to dimensions more favorable to the target of F3EAD.

The “awesome machine,” the name General Stanley McChrystal gave the special operations counterterrorism apparatus, remains heavily represented in the template for how America wages war, even as the operational contexts where it was refined fade further into history. With enhanced technology and increased authorities, operations in Venezuela and Iran built on the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan. The tactical successes of special operations forces in the two-decade war continue to reverberate across the joint force, but without the cautionary warning of that war’s ultimate outcome. A somber accounting of special operations raids and strikes in Afghanistan serves therefore as more than just a matter of historical record-keeping.

Schroden’s examination is not just a needed retrospective, but an urgent warning. Atomizing human targets on the battlespace is a moral hazard, but it is also an operational and strategic risk.

Major Benjamin Van Horrick is the logistics command and control lead at Project Dynamis. He serves as the managing editor of The Connecting File.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, the Departments of the Army or Navy, the US Marine Corps, or the Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Jaerett Engeseth, US Army