Search Results for: Gray Zone

An Ebola Manifesto for the Military Profession

By Major Matt Cavanaugh

There are three conclusions for the military profession to be drawn from the present Ebola outbreak: the threat is enormous, but ultimately manageable; the desired ends are currently vastly under resourced; and the profession’s lack of intellectual focus on the outbreak may result in the nation bumbling towards unnecessary, potentially catastrophic, strategic shock. 

*********************

A selection, on the threat Ebola poses:

There is also a major qualitative factor that makes Ebola much more threatening than nearly any other contemporary threat.  ISIS may do some pretty horrible things on video, but ISIS can’t stop you from showing affection to other human beings.  It’s been remarked that Ebola’s “cultural casualty” has been human contact. One journalist posed the seemingly impossible, but very real scenario in West Africa: “imagine trying not to touch your 2-year-old daughter when she is feverish, vomiting blood and in pain.” We often curse terror groups that use children as human shields; Ebola similarly uses human decency against us by preying on our need for human contact and comfort. Consider that in Sierra Leone, people now tap their chests in place of a handshake.  This is part of the government’s “A-B-C” public health campaign there – “Avoid Bodily Contact.”  Ebola poisons relationships just as much as it does bodies; we might come to a point where “STD” means Socially Transmitted Disease. 

ISIS may strike but does not have the ability to impact our way of life like Ebola.

Read More

Anti-Morale: What causes retreat and surrender?

By Major Matt Cavanaugh

Instead of writing about the “white flag” of surrender – feats of heroism make for a more enjoyable and standard military affairs subject.  That way we avoid the necessary slog through cowardice; who wants to read about people running away?

In the interests of “warming in” to what could be a bit of an ugly subject, the essay will commence with an authoritative source.  Colin Gray in The Strategy Bridge, has written about the “ingredients that make for high enough morale” (p. 215).  These can be “chemical (vodka, rum, indeed anything alcohol), spiritual (trust, inspiration, self-confidence) or a lack of alternatives (desperation).”  Though the list seems a bit grim, it does provide a usable hypothesis (and gives additional meaning to the phrase “liquid courage”).  Gray describes where he believes morale comes from.  An equally useful endeavor might be to consider the opposite – what causes morale to fail?  How does “anti-morale” grow?  For the purposes of this essay, “anti-morale” is defined as the “inability of a group’s members to maintain belief in an institution or goal, particularly in the face of opposition or hardship.”  So, what causes soldiers to run, retreat, and even surrender?

There are several places we could look for help to answer these questions.  We might start with General Ulysses S. Grant, who coerced and compelled the surrender of three Confederate armies in the American Civil War (Forts Henry and Donelson, 14,000 prisoners; Vicksburg, 28,000 prisoners; and Appamatox, 25,000 prisoners).  With these on his resume, we could fairly refer to Grant as the “Patron Saint of Anti-Morale.”  Of course, we have to go beyond Grant – military morale is not so simple a matter.  It might be if militaries were comprised of the obedient guard dogs that Plato counseled in Republic.  Consider the only two qualities WWI-era military dog trainer British Lt. Col. Edwin H. Richardson listed as necessary to propel the canine forward in battle: “affection for master and the love of reward.” (Rebecca Frankel, “The Dog Whisperer,” Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct 2014).  As armies are certainly not comprised of Plato’s dogs – the challenge of maintaining morale is ever present.  Based upon a quick survey of available resources, this essay finds three broad categories of anti-morale: inability to see the connection between tactical action and policy objectives; failure of belief in military and political leaders; and, tactical action is perceived as ineffective, meaningless, or counter to desired objectives.

Read More

Disclaimer

The articles and other content which appear on the Modern War Institute website are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

The Modern War Institute does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Rather, the Modern War Institute provides a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Comments will be moderated before posting to ensure logical, professional, and courteous application to article content.

Upcoming Events

There are no upcoming events.

Announcements