What is Russia’s political object in its war against Ukraine? What is Ukraine’s? And if these are fundamentally irreconcilable, what developments might still bring the war to an end?
These questions are framed in terms of the ideas presented by Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz two hundred years ago. Those ideas—and others from Clausewitz’s On War—offer a powerful lens through which to examine the war in Ukraine. This episode of the MWI Podcast makes use of that lens. In it, John Amble is joined by Dr. Donald Stoker. A historian and professor at the National Defense University’s Eisenhower School, he is also the author of Clausewitz: His Life and Work.
Stoker describes the political outcome each side in the war seeks and explores the question of how far each can—and should—go militarily to achieve that outcome. He also discusses the specific reasons a path toward peace remains elusive and the challenges to establishing one that is sustainable. Throughout the conversation, he applies Clausewitz’s ideas to the conflict—from identifying Russia’s center of gravity to considering Ukraine’s theory of victory—to offer listeners a unique perspective on the war.
The MWI Podcast is produced through an endowment generously funded by the West Point Class of 1974. You can listen to this episode of the podcast below, and if you aren’t already subscribed, be sure to find it on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or your favorite podcast app so you don’t miss an episode. While you’re there, please take just a moment to leave the podcast a rating or give it a review!
Note: The discussion in this episode builds on ideas Stoker discussed, along with Dr. Michael W. Campbell, in a recent article in Military Strategy Magazine, entitled “Clausewitz, Theory, and Ending the Ukraine War,” which you can read here.
Consider the political objective of the opposing sides from the following, more correct, accurate and understandable I believe, perspective.
This such more correct and understandable political objective perspective being — not just from the perspective of Russia and Ukraine alone and by themselves — but, rather, from the perspective of the common political objective of the "states of terror," such as Russia, China, Iran and N. Korea — and from the common political objective of the "states of consent," such as the U.S./the West, Ukraine, Taiwan, S. Korea, etc.:
"In the information age, a state of terror such as the one that Putin’s Russia has become, cannot countenance states of consent, especially next door. It is Ukraine’s constitutional order — with its independent (though still troubled) judicial system, freedom of the press, multiparty politics, largely legitimate elections, vibrant civil society, and general respect for human rights — that Putin cannot tolerate, lest it provide too tempting an example for democratic activists in his own country who have vehemently opposed him at great risk to their lives and to the public in general that shares so many ties to the people in Ukraine. The 'peaceful coexistence' of the Cold War is, in this respect, not acceptable to Putin. …
So Putin’s war is a consequence of his fear that Russia as it is today will inevitably slip from his grasp and that more democratic-leaning leaders there, not just those in Ukraine, will one day petition to become members of NATO and that it will become a state of consent. If the West can protect Ukraine — with advanced anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and other defensive weapons, with a sustained airlift and land convoy of food and medicines, with global economic ostracism of Putin’s regime — that day will come."
(See the March 24, 2022 "Just Security" article "Putin’s Real Fear: Ukraine’s Constitutional Order," by Philip Bobbitt and Viola Gienger.)
Now, with this such much more accurate and complete "political objective" information and picture standing starkly before us, how do we, now and accordingly, apply Clausewitz to this such specific conflict???
Note that — from the perspective that I provide above — Putin (et. al) can "win" in Ukraine (etc.) today; this, in much the same way that the U.S., in the Old Cold War, could "win" in places such as Nicaragua.
Thus — not by some "total military, etc., victory" approach or method — but, rather, by simply adopting some kind of cheaper and more sustainable "fighting" way (in the Nicaraguan case above, by U.S. fomenting a civil war?) — one which prevents your opponent from being able to produce/reproduce (a) a viable and productive state in your back yard; one that (b) would be dangerously attractive to both your own people and those in your neighborhood.
Based on the information that I provide above, what type and/or kind of "ending" to the conflict between Ukraine (et. al) and Russia (etc.) could, possibly, be acceptable to both sides?
a. One in which Ukraine could, and soon would again with the U.S./the West's help, become a viable and attractive market-democracy state; a "state of consent" which would — by way of its example and close proximity to Russia — once again threaten Putin and those of his ilk? (Not likely to be acceptable to Putin, et. al.) Or:
b. One in which Ukraine would renounce market-democracy, and become a "state of terror" like Russia, and/or, allow itself to be folded into the "state of terror" of Mother Russia? (Not likely to be acceptable to Ukraine, etc.)
(From this such perspective, thus, to understand that it will not be about the giving up and/or keeping of territory — such as Crimea and/or the Donbas — by which an end to this conflict can and will be arranged. Rather, this will require that one side or the other will have to "bend" — will have to "concede" — as per my items "a" and "b" above?)