What is your residual?
Image courtesy of FistfulofTalent. By Major Matt Cavanaugh I recently grabbed an old Sports Illustrated (June 23, 2014), and read an Albert Chen story (“Business As Usual”) about the Oakland Athletics. Yes, as the...
Read MoreM. L. Cavanaugh | 09.02.14 | Commentary & Analysis
Image courtesy of FistfulofTalent. By Major Matt Cavanaugh I recently grabbed an old Sports Illustrated (June 23, 2014), and read an Albert Chen story (“Business As Usual”) about the Oakland Athletics. Yes, as the...
Read MoreM. L. Cavanaugh | 08.27.14 | Commentary & Analysis
For some, this title might seem a bit strange – what could anyone learn about war from a three year old? I’d categorize those people as “non-parents.” Anyone who has regularly faced a small child knows that there are direct parallels between child-rearing and human conflict. And, though the Spartans started training at the age of seven, our daughter has taught my wife and I a lifetime of lessons on war and strategy at the relatively advanced age of three. Here are a few, in no particular order:
1. If you do not pick the right battles, you will lose.
Sometimes, her will is greater than ours – as with anything pertaining to her “blanky” (AKA “blanket”). Tony Stark doesn’t care as much about his Iron Man suit’s power source than my daughter does about that blue rag.
2. Strategies of exhaustion.
Fabius couldn’t slow down scooter traffic at an old folks home compared to our daughter; Ho Chi Minh would look impatient next to her. Or, as the Taliban likes to say, my wife and I may have the watches (and wallets), but our daughter has the time (and our money).
3. The nature of terrorism.
Children often perform conversation terrorism. Like a grenade, they roll into the middle of a stimulating conversation, indiscriminately throwing shrapnel at innocent bystanders. This detonation often induces mental paralysis in adults; victims typically survive if medevac’d to naptime within the “golden hour.”
Read MoreM. L. Cavanaugh | 08.21.14 | Commentary & Analysis
Image courtesy of the Wall Street Journal. Pull Pin, Throw Grenade, Run Away: A provocative thought to kick off the weekend… By Major Matt Cavanaugh Should retired generals and admirals be allowed to “cash in”...
Read MoreM. L. Cavanaugh | 08.20.14 | Commentary & Analysis
Image courtesy of the Centers for Disease Control. By Major Matt Cavanaugh Public Radio International runs a great news program (locally, it’s usually on National Public Radio) called “The World.” The other...
Read MoreM. L. Cavanaugh | 08.17.14 | Commentary & Analysis
*Note: This essay is based on remarks to be delivered on Tuesday, 19 August 2014, at the Defense & Strategic Studies War Council event, “Summer Wars: ISIS, Ukraine, and Gaza.”
The Oxford historian Margaret McMillan recently related a story taken from the opening scenes of World War I:
“The leading newspaper editor in Berlin took his family to Belgium on July 27, 1914. Before he went, he checked with the German Foreign Secretary. He asked, ‘There’s a bit of a crisis developing – do you think it’s safe to take my family to Belgium?’ The German Foreign Secretary responded: ‘oh yes, don’t worry, it’ll all be over by next week.'”
Unfortunately, we can see the same complacency today. The New York Times recently described an analysis of campaign advertisements from July 2014. Of the 1,155 ads, only 49, or about 4%, were about any subject even remotely resembling foreign policy. Despite all that is happening in Iraq and Syria, Ukraine, and in Gaza – on some broad level – what happens beyond the water’s edge is for someone else to care about.
Thankfully, anyone reading this essay is cut from a slightly different bolt of cloth. There’s interest in what goes on overseas, or, in seeing the world as it is. Any reader on War Council is naturally inclined to study the use of force, particularly warm and hot battlefields. Like storm chasers, often, the closer you get the better you’ll understand the wind patterns and trends. However, if you can’t get to the precise center (or vortex), what follows are some things I think you might deem important to consider in your observations of Iraq (and Syria/ISIS), Ukraine, and Gaza from afar – so you can better understand the environment we live (and may fight) in.
IRAQ
With respect to Iraq, did the U.S. “win” or “lose” there? Does that even matter? Consider the complexity, the many sides, which I’ve referred to previously as a Rubik’s cube war. ISIS defies definition. I’ve heard former CIA Deputy Director Mike Morrell refer to the group as a “terrorist army,” typically a contradiction in terms.
Some suggest that airpower is the solution to stopping ISIS. But we should start by asking what airpower can do. Simply put, airpower is great at engagement, but provides no sustained commitment – as Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins has put it, airpower is kind of a one-night stand in that respect. Moreover, one should ask: when is airpower effective? Since November 1911, when an Italian pilot dropped three hand grenades out of his monoplane at some Turks in Libya, there have been two general conditions for success in airpower:
1. If the enemy moves in open terrain; no cover or concealment (i.e. desert).
2. If the enemy has no air force or useful anti-aircraft weapons to speak of.
Reasonable military judgment would conclude from this basic analysis that we cannot compel ISIS to victory through airpower as they will (for now) be able to take shelter in cities like Mosul. They can still find sanctuary through the cover that cities and populations provide. However, airpower can deny them open traffickability and supply routes in between the cities they hold – and that’s very valuable. That forces adaptation in their behavior. In car racing, there’s an old adage that “you win in the turns.” Similarly we might be able to break something loose if ISIS handles this strategic adjustment poorly.
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Modern War Journal: Autonomy on the Modern Battlefield
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15 February, 2026
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