The United States has a new National Security Strategy (NSS), and for the first time in decades, transnational terrorism is almost entirely absent from it. The strategy, released in mid-December by President Donald Trump’s second administration, describes Islamist terrorist activity is simply something Washington “must remain wary of . . . in parts of Africa”—on the document’s very last page. Terrorism “might force our urgent attention,” the strategy notes, but it is far from its focus. Instead, a host of other threats to the homeland are prioritized, including immigration, drugs, and foreign influence operations, while encouraging more burden sharing among allies and acknowledging broad spheres of influence globally.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, counterterrorism was front and center. Efforts to ensure another 9/11 never happened again led to vast expansions of government, intelligence, law enforcement, and military programs to that end; Osama Bin Laden was killed almost ten years later, in May 2011. Even so, that very same year the Department of Justice ran an anniversary article proclaiming that preventing “further terrorist attacks on this country . . . remains the highest priority and most urgent work of the department.” Those priorities, however, have since shifted at least twice under subsequent administrations, each time signaling reduced relative concern about the transnational Islamic terrorist threat.
This is, in part, because there has not yet been another 9/11 in the United States, allowing focus on terrorism to wane without outcry. To some degree this is understandable. The first Trump administration shifted focus to great power competition against major rivals, a focus that further expanded under the Biden administration, with an eye toward state adversaries’ growing cooperation. As Mara Karlin has described, “total war” is taking over, and the complex nature of the current geostrategic environment is expanding conflict across borders, and in some cases, leading to unprecedented adversary cooperation. This has been exemplified in varying Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean support for Russia since it invaded Ukraine in 2022. Meanwhile, China continues to expand its partnership with Russia as it strengthens economically and militarily, while China watchers continue to look for signs as to whether Beijing will invade Taiwan in 2027.
Pivots in national security priorities are natural, of course, but the one marked by this month’s NSS release—focused above all on the homeland—marks the most significant deprioritization of the transnational Islamic terrorism threats of the 2000s. The biggest threats now, per the strategy, appear to come from “narco-terrorists” and “transnational criminal organizations.” We fear this shift places the United States’ interests at risk, both at home and abroad, and raises the likelihood that Washington would be less able to prevent a major attack.
A Concerning Shift in Focus
Redefining Threats
Terrorism has not disappeared from the purview of Washington entirely. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (a document published by the US intelligence community that reflects its collective interpretations of the most pressing threats to the United States) acknowledges the direct threat transnational Islamist terrorism presents to the homeland. Indeed, the Trump administration used Iran’s state sponsor of terrorism status to justify strikes on its nuclear program, seemingly in recognition of the potential threat extending beyond Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
The shift outlined in the NSS was expected: Most of the administration’s policies since last January have worked to redefine terrorist threats, including the definition of a “terrorist group.” Since February, the Trump administration has officially designated over a dozen South and Central American cartels or gangs as terrorist groups (as well as four far left or anarchist groups in Europe)—a dramatic departure from the more than fifty predominantly Islamist terrorist groups that were added from 2001 to 2021. With these groups now designated as terrorists, the US military has been carrying out strikes against them since September. The Annual Threat Assessment also appears to prioritize “foreign illicit drug actors” ahead of Islamist terrorists—probably for the first time in recent history.
Meanwhile, Trump has met twice with Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who has longstanding ties to al-Qaeda, including inviting him to the White House in November—the first ever visit by a Syrian leader. Earlier this year, the administration removed longstanding sanctions on Syria and delisted Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group al-Sharaa led for eight years, as a designated foreign terrorist group. These moves all signal a downplaying of the Islamist terror threat.
Deprioritizing Africa and the Middle East
The recently released NSS also appears to further deprioritize Africa, continuing a trend since the Trump administration took office. It explicitly warns against “avoiding any long-term American presence or commitments” on the continent. Earlier this year, the State Department signaled that it planned to reduce focus on Africa amid plans to cut related budgets. While the department considers over thirty embassy and consulate closures—more than half in Africa—the Defense Department plans to reduce counterterrorism support, urging African countries to take greater responsibility for their own security.
Meanwhile, sub-Saharan Africa has arguably become the epicenter of Islamist terrorism. In 2014, of the countries with the most terrorist attacks and related fatalities, Nigeria was the only African nation on the list with Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Syria. By 2024, most of the countries within the top ten for terrorist activity were African.
Likewise, the NSS makes a clear move away from the Middle East, citing energy diversification and less superpower competition, though still briefly acknowledging the need to ensure the region does not export terrorism. It remains to be seen if the Middle East will allow this shift—it has been tried before (recall the “pivot to Asia”), only to be derailed by new or unresolved conflicts in the region.
Why Washington Shouldn’t Forget About Terrorism
Global Impact of a Single Attack
The October 7, 2023 attack in Israel demonstrates that a terrorist attack on an ally abroad (as opposed to the homeland) can have wide-reaching consequences. The largest terrorist attack since 9/11 led to a regional conflict with implications extending both globally and into the United States. The attack ultimately triggered a military confrontation between Israel and Iran that was decidedly conventional and pulled the United States into the fight. When the Houthis joined the conflict, targeting international trade and Western shipping, the United States formed a multinational naval coalition called Operation Prosperity Guardian.
In the two years following the October 7 attack, the United States has been compelled to make trade-offs to enable support to Middle East operations. In August 2024 and again in June 2025, the US Navy moved carrier strike groups from counter-China operations in the South China Sea to the Middle East to support US operations against the Houthis and Israel’s air defense efforts, respectively. In addition, as Israel’s conflict with Hamas has raged for nearly two years, the Pentagon has been forced to make tough choices regarding supplying limited weapons to Ukraine and Israel, providing some relief to Russia.
The October 7 attack and subsequent military operations also presented US adversaries with a host of opportunities to exploit and sow domestic dissent in the United States. This was, and continues to be, the easiest and most cost-effective way to undermine US support for Israeli operations. The day after the Israeli military campaign commenced in Gaza, fake accounts were launched to undercut US support for Israel—accounts tied to China, Russia, and Iran. Hamas sympathizers mixed in with pro-Palestinian protesters, who are lauded—if not supported by—Iran and the terrorist groups themselves, have wreaked havoc on US university campuses and targeted US businesses perceived as supporting Israel with boycotts, protests, and vandalism.
Terrorist Groups Remain Active, Focused on the West, and Poised To Attack
Since their peak in 2015, total terrorism deaths have decreased by 31 percent, according to the Global Terrorism Index. However, this overall decline is largely due to significant drops in Iraq; if those numbers are removed, then terrorist-related deaths have increased slightly. Moreover, terrorism-related deaths in the Sahel are continuing to rise at alarming levels and, in 2024, accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths. In fact, this region is now a hotbed for terrorism—and this comes at a time during which the Trump administration is looking to disengage from the region, including considering dismantling US Africa Command.
Furthermore, terrorist groups have demonstrated their intent to continue targeting the West, while their potential capabilities continue to grow. In June, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s leader released a video address calling on jihadist sympathizers, particularly in the United States and Europe, to mount attacks on companies that support the US military or Israel, naming several specific companies as examples. The sustained intent also comes at a time during which terrorist groups are poised to exponentially increase their capabilities. Off-the-shelf drones are already being used on battlefields in Iraq, in the Russia-Ukraine War, and in conflicts elsewhere, and are cheaply available for purchase by those with even limited funds. Furthermore, the ever-increasing capabilities offered by artificial intelligence have the potential to significantly enhance terrorists’ weapons and targeting capabilities, with some AI experts warning that any user with a computer might, within a few years, be able to create chemical or biological weapons in a garage.
US Adversaries Are Taking Advantage
Russia and China are already filling the vacuum of diminished US interest in combatting terrorism. This is especially true in Africa, where Russia has displaced the United States and its Western allies as the preferred security partner. After the Wagner Group dissolved in 2023, Moscow rebranded the private military company as the Africa Corps, putting it under greater state control. In addition, Russia has signed military cooperation agreements with over thirty African countries and operates primarily in Mali, Libya, and the Central African Republic—one country where the United States is considering closing its embassy. Russian forces moved into Niger in 2024 after the United States withdrew one thousand troops from the country. China, meanwhile, is seeking to expand nascent counterterrorism support in exchange for political and economic influence in Africa through its Global Security Initiative, launched in 2022 and also aimed at countries where the United States has limiting or diminishing presence.
Reincorporating Terrorism into US Policy
The evolving landscape of global threats demands that the United States resist the temptation to view terrorism as a relic of the past. While the absence of another 9/11-scale attack on the homeland has allowed policymakers to shift priorities toward great power competition and domestic challenges, the October 7 attack in Israel and the surge of terrorist activity in Africa are stark reminders that the threat of transnational Islamist terrorism remains potent and unpredictable.
The US intelligence community and policymakers must maintain resources and focus on developing terrorist threats—even if they are not yet transnational—to avoid future surprise. To date, al-Shabaab is the only group in sub-Saharan Africa to have demonstrated its intent to strike globally, but that should not mean Washington is free to ignore other groups until they become a problem. If the United States isn’t closely monitoring other localized groups, it will be unable to determine when their intentions or capabilities evolve in a manner to threaten US interests. When the United States (like Israel) took its focus off Hamas and the Gaza Strip before October 2023, it subsequently found itself scrambling to keep up.
Global threats are too interconnected to tackle separately. Policies and budgets derived from the NSS must acknowledge the intersection between a range of threats to the homeland, including transnational terrorism, nation-state adversaries, and illicit drug actors. In efforts to increase burden sharing, the United States could look for opportunities to work more closely with current allies both on the battlefield in counterterrorism operations and behind closed doors through intelligence sharing and diplomatic outreach. US policy must reflect the nature of the threats the homeland is facing and seek opportunities to deepen our current friendships in order to be better prepared and share limited resources to combat terrorism.
To safeguard the homeland and maintain global stability, US policy must reincorporate counterterrorism as a core priority—recognizing that terrorist threats are deeply intertwined with nation-state competition, narcotrafficking, and other threats to the homeland. By fostering robust alliances, investing in intelligence, and remaining vigilant against the evolving tactics and technologies of terrorist organizations, the United States can prevent future surprises and uphold its security commitments. The cost of complacency is too high in a world where a single attack can reshape both domestic and regional dynamics and reverberate across the globe for years.
Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She previously spent well over a decade in various positions and organizations supporting US policymakers. She teaches courses on national security, terrorism and policy support at Carnegie Mellon University.
Sydney Laite served as a senior intelligence officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency, where she worked for over fifteen years. During her tenure, she focused extensively on Middle East issues and, most recently, provided direct intelligence support to the prior secretary of defense. Sydney currently works in private sector intelligence and holds a master of science in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.