Recent developments culminating in kinetic US military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and Iran’s retaliatory strike on Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar have radically altered America’s posture since the beginning of the year. Israeli and American air operations against Iranian targets have been extremely effective, and demonstrate impressive capabilities, but these successes should not obscure the reality that every commitment signals adversaries about opportunities and constraints. Beijing is undoubtedly keeping a weather eye on American disposition, industrial capacity, and will as the US strikes deepened American involvement in the region’s unstable security landscape.

The question is not whether Chinese aggression against Taiwan is imminent—such predictions are inherently speculative and counterproductive. Rather, the United States must soberly assess what signals its strategic choices are sending and ensure that decision-makers in Beijing understand that American capability and resolve in the Pacific remain undiminished despite its intervention in the war between Iran and Israel.

The Reality of Force Structure

The redistribution of American military assets to support Middle Eastern operations creates observable gaps that any competent adversary would analyze. A Patriot battalion was transferred from South Korea to US Central Command in April 2025—particularly significant given China’s emphasis on missile and drone capabilities in any Taiwan scenario. Similarly, the USS Nimitz‘s movement from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East has left the USS George Washington as the sole forward-deployed carrier in the Western Pacific.

The United States military, despite its unprecedented global reach, operates within finite resource parameters. When assets move to address one crisis, they necessarily create reduced capacity elsewhere. This harsh reality is not lost on leaders in Beijing, who have spent decades studying American deployment patterns and response timelines.

Industrial Base Transformation

The increased strain on America’s defense industrial base is an ongoing problem with no short-term solution. The support to Ukraine has stressed production lines for critical munitions. Support for Israel since the beginning of its war against Hamas in 2023—and its opening of a second front against Hezbollah and direct confrontation with Iran—has similarly diminished American interceptors and precision-guided bombs, to say nothing of the dozens of interceptors expended during the Iranian attack on Al-Udeid Air Base. Even with the ceasefire being negotiated between Israel and Iran, American forces must remain postured with stockpiles of munitions, air defense interceptors, and specialized ordnance—the same categories of long-range weapons essential in any Pacific conflict.

President Donald Trump’s emphasis on reshoring American industrial capacity represents sound long-term policy, but this sort of industrial transformation requires years, not months. In the interim, keeping forces postured in both Europe and the Middle East will exacerbate the strain on ammunition stockpiles and production capacity.

The defense industrial base challenge extends beyond materiel to maintenance, logistics, and personnel. Having commitments in three major theaters at once places wear on equipment, strain supply chains, and fatigue crews. These effects compound over time, potentially creating windows of reduced readiness that adversaries might attempt to exploit. The current NATO summit, where members agreed to raise their defense expenditures to 5 percent of their GDP, is a step forward, but America’s European allies have until 2035 to reach that goal.

China’s leadership may view the current period as offering a more favorable balance of American capability versus commitment than might exist in the future.

Military Transformation

The timing of America’s Middle Eastern engagement coincides with a period of significant military transformation. These transformation efforts reflect necessary adaptation to evolving threats, but they also create temporary vulnerabilities during the period of transition. The Army’s ongoing transformation initiative will almost certainly entail major changes not just in equipment and weapons systems, but also in doctrine, training, and even culture. The Air Force’s development of sixth-generation fighter capabilities is happening concurrently with its own organizational rework.

Most notably for the Pacific, the Navy’s force structure is facing challenges. The retirement of littoral combat ships without immediate replacement reduces the number of hulls available for distributed operations in the South China Sea. The Constellation-class frigates have been delayed until 2029—three years behind the original 2026 timeline. The Navy estimates that it will take until at least 2031 to reach the three-hundred-ship goal that it has set for itself.

Political Transformation

The American political landscape adds another layer of complexity to strategic signaling. The debate within the American right between supporters and opponents of military action abroad and the broader tension between the US role in the international order and isolationist currents create uncertainty about long-term commitments. Beijing closely monitors American political discourse, looking for signs of war weariness, resource constraints, or divided leadership that might limit American responses to Chinese actions. The current period of intense Middle Eastern focus, combined with ongoing domestic political divisions, may suggest to Chinese leaders that American attention and political capital are stretched across multiple priorities.

Oil, the Black Blood of War

Perhaps most significantly, instability in Iran could fundamentally alter global energy dynamics in ways that directly threaten Chinese interests. Iran supplies roughly 10 percent of China’s crude oil imports, a sizable chunk of Beijing’s imported energy. A collapse of the Iranian regime—or its replacement with a government aligned with American interests—could create conditions similar to those facing Japan in July 1941, when an American oil embargo contributed to Tokyo’s use-it-or-lose-it decision to strike the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Historical analogies are fraught, but the underlying dynamic bears consideration. China is the world’s largest importer of oil, and half of it comes from the Middle East. Any disruption to these flows would create severe economic pressures. If Xi Jinping came to believe that his energy supply was under imminent threat, he might reach a similar conclusion: act decisively before the window closes—seize Taiwan, break the first island chain, and lock in a new status quo before oil shortages strand the People’s Liberation Army Navy and his invasion fleet at anchor.

The Long Game: Awareness, Not Augury

The ultimate strategic irony is that American success in the Middle East may actually strengthen long-term Pacific deterrence, even as it creates near-term vulnerabilities. The combat experience for both personnel and equipment is invaluable—particular for when it comes to air defense tactics and techniques. While the air strikes and air defense involved a small physical number of people, the lessons learned are disproportionate to the personnel involved, and will be codified into future doctrine. War provides insights that no exercise can replicate, something that China is far behind the United States in. Putting these lessons learned into use, however, depends on successfully concluding operations in Europe and the Middle East before China decides to test American resolve in the Pacific.

The goal here is not to vainly attempt to predict Chinese behavior but to highlight the importance of strategic awareness during a period of significant American commitment abroad. Every deployment decision, every expenditure of munitions, and every political statement sends signals to adversaries about American capabilities, priorities, and constraints.

The United States must ensure that its actions in the Middle East do not inadvertently signal reduced commitment to Pacific allies or diminished capability to respond to Chinese aggression. This requires careful attention to force positioning, clear communication of priorities, and robust intelligence collection focused on Chinese military preparations and decision-making processes.

Most importantly, American leaders must recognize that military success in one theater does not automatically translate to deterrent credibility in another. The impressive performance of Israeli and American airpower against Iranian targets demonstrates tactical and operational proficiency, but strategic deterrence depends on adversaries believing that such capabilities can be brought to bear against them specifically.

The current period presents both opportunities and risks for American policymakers. A successful ceasefire and denuclearization treaty negotiated with Iran could demonstrate American military capability and resolve. However, the resource commitments, force deployments, and political attention required for such success also create potential windows of vulnerability that adversaries might attempt to exploit.

The key is maintaining awareness of these dynamics while avoiding both complacency and Chicken Little’ing about World War III. Beijing’s thinking on Taiwan is shaped by many factors—internal politics, economic pressures, and the regional military balance. But it would be a grave mistake to assume that US actions don’t weigh heavily in that calculus.

Chinese leaders watch America’s force posture and rhetoric closely. If they see weakness—real or perceived—they may decide the time is ripe to move. Robert Jervis argued very compellingly that wars often start when one side misjudges the other’s capabilities or resolve. American policymakers must ensure that our words and actions—in any region, not just the Indo-Pacific—send a clear and consistent message. Deterrence only works when it’s credible.

In today’s world of strategic competition and growing multipolarity, tradeoffs are unavoidable. The critical point is to make them with clear eyes, always understanding how a move in one theater affects stability in another.

Peter Mitchell is a strategist and air defense expert. You can follow him on X @peternmitchell.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.

Image: A US Air Force B-2 Spirit takes off to support Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, June 2025.