In June 2024, our unit—2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment—had a unique opportunity: we were directed to execute the first combat training center rotation forward in the Indo-Pacific. Not long ago, this would have been impossible—the Army’s premier training environments were only found at sprawling, fixed sites in California, Louisiana, and Germany. But the creation of the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center–Exportable, a capability that enables realistic training in theater, opens the door for Army, joint, and partner forces to test themselves against the particular challenges of the Pacific region. Those challenges are manifold, but we discovered important historical continuities.
As we captured our lessons learned it became clear these were the same things battalions learned during key periods of World War II—like the seizure of Luzon in 1945—and even farther back during the Spanish-American War. The experience reinforced the value of this training, not only in the strategic and operational imperatives it achieves, but in the way that it reacquaints our ground troops with the timeless challenges of land war in Asia.
The Tropic Lightning Division is no stranger to fighting on this terrain. The 25th Infantry Division spent twelve continuous years in Asia from World War II, through the occupation of Japan, and to the Korean War. After a short break, it spent seven additional years in Vietnam. The division is no stranger to this terrain. Nor is the 27th Infantry Regiment—the Wolfhounds’ long history in Asia, especially in the Philippines, traces back to 1901. This rotation in support of Operation PATHWAYS is just the latest episode in that long history. But what made it distinct is the training opportunity provided by the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center–Exportable, or JPMRC-X. This is what enabled us to learn from the experience.
United States Army Pacific executes a continual campaign in strategic competition named Operation Pathways, designed to build joint interior lines forward, create interoperability with our allies and partners, and enable US troops to learn the key terrain they may be called to defend alongside those they will be defending it with. The 25th Infantry Division has conducted the Balikatan and Salaknib Exercises in the Philippines since 2016 as a part of Operation Pathways. In 2024, however, Salaknib was conducted under the auspices of JPMRC-X, and executed west of the international date line for the first time. The No Fear Battalion (2-27 Infantry) was the tactical infantry unit assigned to work alongside our Philippine allies at Fort Magsaysay, in Luzon, the Philippines. Here’s what we learned.
The Environment
A high heat index above 110 degrees Fahrenheit paired with daily evening thunderstorms created the largest risk to the mission during the JPMRC-X rotation. The natural terrain and elevation change became the most significant risk during dismounted movements. Our battalion lost a platoon’s worth of combat power over the course of JPMRC-X due to disease and nonbattle injury, as well as heat. The environment created natural movement windows and severe restrictions that had equal effects on 2-27 Infantry, our ally, and the adversary. Adaptation to the environment was required to accomplish the mission.
Disease
Disease and nonbattle injury is historically the number one cause of casualties in this environment. It’s not the first thing that comes to mind in 2024, and we found out the hard way. It is shocking and brutally true how much the environment matters, and it still produces the most casualties. In our battalion, 116 soldiers were treated at our battalion medical station, including seventy-seven infections and sixteen heat injuries. Of the sixteen heat injuries, fifteen soldiers had mild heat exhaustion and one had exertional heat injury (no heat strokes). Additionally, there was a significant number of soldiers that suffered from gastrointestinal issues. Due to the consumption of local food, unpurified water, or other gastrointestinal issues, our battalion consumed 143 percent of its planned stock of antidiarrheals, and 97 percent of gastrointestinal medications. Typically, units preparing to deploy focus on fitness and acclimatization to reduce heat injuries. Rarely do they take active measures to prevent disease and nonbattle injury, our biggest issue. Countless historical examples should have made us think twice. As one historian has written, “The fate of besieged Bataan [during World War II] was determined not by the Japanese arms but by malaria and malnutrition.”
Physical Readiness
We must train differently. Traditional metrics are not the benchmarks for success. Being ready to win is all that matters. The current way we measure readiness drives how we train. The Army Combat Fitness Test and road marches have their place as baselines for general fitness. They do not achieve realistic preparation for this operational environment, however. Our unit went into this operation as the fittest battalion in our division based on ACFT scores, no small achievement. We learned this was not the preparation needed to meet this mission.
What we needed was a time under load for longer durations on tough terrain. There is no replacing it. The only way to be ready to walk all night is to do it. The second factor that is hard to replicate is the heat and humidity. By the time the Wolfhounds executed JPMRC-X, soldiers were in theater for over sixty days. They had acclimatized to executing long days in the heat and returning to an air-conditioned tent at night to rest. Ten days without respite was a shock to the system. Even for the fittest battalion, the environment proved exceedingly challenging.
What will we do next time? First, we will get under our rucks and off the road. We will do this deliberately and build toward tactical endurance. Conquering the hardest terrain we can find at home station will build confidence, if it is done routinely. Also, we will train with heavy rucks, but we will cut the load significantly during JPMRC-X and carry only the essential items—ammo, food, water, etc. Our Filipino partners did this exceptionally well, but we did not. Second, we will lift weights with the mission in mind. We will enable this through mission-specific lifting programs focused on the posterior chain and a deliberate recovery plan to enable the intensity of the training. We will deliberately seek out heat by shifting our workouts to the hottest parts of the day. Finally, we will continue to train deliberately upon arrival because acclimatization upon arrival is not enough. We must invest the time and deliberate planning to ensure we are ready to execute the assigned mission in the operating environment. We must accept that our traditional metrics to measure fitness may suffer.
Power Generation
The next great challenge we faced was power generation. Our battalion tactical action center (TAC) was powered by a three-thousand-watt generator and our subordinate units had thousand-watt generators. We had the requisite number of batteries to power our communications systems, calculated from our Oahu-based training. Our method had always been to recharge systems during halts using the generators: with a few gallons of gas and resupply every few days, there were no issues.
We learned the incredibly high heat index sapped the batteries of all our systems at a much more rapid rate than we had seen. Battery life was cut in half. Specific issues we discovered were the use of radios mounted in the bags of our dismounted troops, where the increased heat drained batteries rapidly. This meant that radios had to be switched off when not in use. This was a huge change to how we normally operate, with persistent communications. To meet this challenge, we have adopted a methodology based on communications windows. Communications are made during specific windows for short durations. This reduces the power-generation burden but forces a shift in how we operate. Without direct communications, higher headquarters must accept that their subordinate units are executing as tasked. Interestingly, our allies, accustomed to the challenges we were facing for the first time, already utilize this method, and it was the only method available to the generations of soldiers operating in this environment before us.
This constraint was not limited to radios. It also applies to computers and our sUAS (small unmanned aircraft systems) flying in support of operations. Our laptops in the TAC were unable to manage the heat, even in limited use. Any communication linkage that involved computer-based systems was untenable. Our sUAS batteries depleted rapidly during daytime flights and, in two instances, caused the sUAS to lose their links. This is a significant lesson and requires a significant shift in current procedures. One solution is more rugged equipment with a higher heat tolerance. We are working to acquire and test such equipment. Another solution is to abide by communication windows, and rely on systems such as high-frequency and tactical satellite radio communications for brief updates and minimal guidance. These are not new lessons. This, at its core, is what mission command is. How often did troops in the Spanish-American War or World War II receive a change in mission? It is only through technology and becoming accustomed to operating in permissive environments that we have gotten away from this key lesson. We must train how we will be forced to fight.
Communications
Every tactician knows communications only matter if they work when you need them, and JPMRC-X is the best communication exercise a soldier could hope for. We arrived in the Philippines confident in our systems, having tested them all over Oahu, and believed we achieved tactical-level interoperability. At home station and at Fort Magsaysay, we successfully linked our allies’ radio systems into our mesh network utilizing radio over internet protocol, and successfully provided mobile company- and battalion-level command and control from an MRZR tactical vehicle. JPMRC-X, however, challenged our communications architecture. Our allies were no longer embedded in our formations, and as a result, our methods were limited by the Philippine Army’s radios. In this case, our allies’ FM radio was only as good as line of sight. During our train up our communications were good. Now that we were disaggregated, we could not make a connection via radio with our allies beyond a few hundred meters and this did not meet our mission profile. Despite all our equipment and training, the fastest way we adapted to the circumstances was to conduct physical linkups.
If we can talk, we can fight. To do better next time, we must build our communication architecture to have compatibility beyond line-of-sight communications with our allies. The solutions range from low-tech and well established, such as high-frequency radio comms, to high-tech (and more expensive), such as Iridium satellite phones. The good news is that both solutions are available and easy to train.
Additionally, StarLink-enabled communications worked to a limited degree. StarLink creates an internet connection via low-earth orbit satellites. This enabled us to establish internal WiFi networks, connecting our TAC to our voice and data communications. This connection, however, could not extend to our subordinate units or our allies, unless they achieved an internet connection. We normally filled this gap utilizing cell towers, which worked until we moved into challenging terrain and the signal was gone—along with our mesh network.
We took several lessons away from this. First, redundant communications must include redundant transport options (ways to achieve internet signal). Second, we must have low-tech solutions such as high-frequency radio communications. Third, this only works if it can be linked to our allies.
In the end, our most effective method to achieve communications interoperability was the way it has always been done: face to face and through liaison exchanges on the ground. The fact is technology cannot replace this interface. People working shoulder to shoulder can overcome any obstacle. Reflecting on how our predecessors over many generations must have done it, this should have been our starting point, and we would recommend it as the starting point for follow-on units to build from.
Sustainment
Large traditional equipment is of limited use. We quickly discovered our standard equipment would not work in this environment. While our battalion is trained in off-road driving, our vehicles did not fit on the smaller unimproved roads we encountered. We spent significant time conducting route reconnaissance and discovered our MRZRs, Humvees, and local pickup trucks were the only vehicles that would traverse this terrain. This had massive implications for the way we normally do sustainment. Instead of large vehicles dropping resupply in bulk we had to transport lots of small packages much closer to our frontline troops.
The two most effective methods were aerial resupply and leveraging local nationals with their 4×4 vehicles. However, in a contested environment with a near-peer threat, aerial resupply is a high-risk endeavor and will likely be reserved for emergencies. To effectively train and match that risk, one thing we wish we had explored more was living off the economy. While the roads were small, the area was populated, even in the training area, and everywhere we went there were small stores or an enterprising entrepreneur who would have been happy to feed us, give us water, and fuel our machines for pennies on the dollar. Thriving in this environment may require operationalizing the dollar at the lowest level.
Terrain does not change, and its challenges remain evergreen. There is no replicating it fully. It is invaluable to train on the terrain, with your ally, that you may be called to defend. Our Army’s history is one of war in Asia. Once we captured the key lessons of our operation, their historical precedent leaped out at us. It is imperative to pass this along to ensure these lessons remain learned and observed for the next campaign. JPRMC-X is the crucible for land forces that must be prepared to fight and win in Asia. There is no substitute.
Major Rick Blank is the operations officer for 2-27 Infantry and served in this position during the 2024 Operation Pathways exercises. Rick has served as an operational planner at US Army Pacific and is a graduate of the Maritime Warfare School and Naval War College.
Lieutenant Colonel Tyler Patterson is the commander of 2-27 Infantry and served in this position during the 2024 Operation Pathways exercises. Tyler has taught at West Point and served in multiple assignments in the infantry, the interagency, and the special operations community.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Spc. Carleeann Smiddy, US Army National Guard