The next war may begin without a sound—in orbit, far above the battlefield. As satellite proximity operations, grappling technologies, and AI-enabled space systems proliferate, space is no longer just a technical domain; it is a new theater of power. Orbital assets are fast becoming the front line of great power confrontation, yet international norms and deterrence doctrines have not caught up, creating a world that is dangerously unprepared for the political and military consequences of space-based first strikes.

In March 2025, US Space Force General Michael A. Guetlein, the vice chief of space operations, revealed that American systems had observed “five different objects in space maneuvering in and out and around each other in synchronicity and in control,” a scenario he called “dogfighting in space.” China, along with the United States and other major space powers, is rapidly developing counterspace capabilities. These aren’t science-fiction weapons; they reflect a strategic shift. Satellites are the nervous system of modern warfare, vital for intelligence, navigation, and communication. Disabling an adversary’s satellites can blind its battlefield or situational awareness and create a powerful advantage in the early stages of conflict.

Unlike traditional warfare, there is no clear legal framework for what constitutes aggression in space. Satellite interference can be framed as a malfunction, a test, or a provocation, making it an ideal gray-zone tactic. The first move in the next major conflict may not come as a missile strike or cyberattack, but as a silent, deniable maneuver in orbit that signals war before the world even realizes it has begun, just like the February 2022 cyberattack on Viasat in the hours before Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Orbital Infrastructure

Orbital infrastructures are vast, planet-spanning systems that materially and politically structure how we monitor, secure, and conceptualize threats to Earth. Columba Peoples and Tim Stevens describe them as “sociotechnical assemblages”—networks of satellites, ground stations, governance frameworks, and human expertise that link activity in space to politics, economics, and security on Earth.

Most people don’t realize how deeply embedded these systems are in daily life. Satellites power GPS navigation, enable global internet and phone service, forecast the weather, and monitor climate change. They support financial transactions, TV broadcasts, communications, and emergency response. Without them, much of the modern world—from logistics to banking—would slow down or stop entirely. They are part of the critical, invisible infrastructure that makes modern life possible, as essential and often overlooked as power lines, undersea cables, or air traffic control systems.

Militarily, satellites are indispensable. They enable real-time surveillance of troop movements, missile deployments, and naval activity, providing the awareness of the operational environment that modern commanders rely on. They support secure communications across continents and guide precision weapons using GPS. Some systems even provide early warning of missile launches, offering precious minutes to respond. In modern conflict, satellites aren’t a backdrop; they’re part of the battlefield.

These orbital infrastructures are more than tools of observation or communication; they are embedded in the machinery of modern statecraft. From coordinating humanitarian relief to supporting precision targeting and military operations, they blur the line between civilian and military systems. As their strategic value grows, so too does the need to define and defend their boundaries—before another state tests them in silence.

Satellite Tampering as a First Strike

Satellite tampering refers to any deliberate interference with a satellite’s function—increasingly seen as a potential first move in modern conflict. This can include jamming (blocking radio signals), dazzling (using lasers to blind sensors), cyber intrusion (hijacking or disabling a satellite remotely), or even physical manipulation (maneuvering near or pushing another satellite out of position). What makes satellite tampering so dangerous is that it can be done silently, without debris or explosions, making it both feasible and deniable. In a tense geopolitical moment, disrupting satellites could blind an opponent’s surveillance, sever communications, or degrade navigation, all without firing a single shot on the ground. Not only is this kind of interference invisible to the naked eye, but it can also be layered: Attackers may alter or erase diagnostic data itself, leaving operators uncertain whether a satellite is malfunctioning, compromised, or both. Recent events like GPS anomalies and a tanker collision near the Strait of Hormuz on June 17 demonstrate how invisible, electronic interference in space-based systems can have real-world, dangerous consequences without a traceable act of war.

Reports of “dogfighting in space”—with Chinese satellites maneuvering in synchronized, controlled formation, simulating close-range orbital combat—underscore how real and immediate this threat has become. While not openly hostile, these actions demonstrate the capability to trail, shadow, and potentially interfere with foreign satellites. Combined with advances in cyber and electronic warfare, these maneuvers suggest that space is shifting from a support domain to an active battlefield. The line between exercise and aggression is blurring, and satellite tampering is no longer theoretical. It has become a tool for signaling, disruption, and disabling critical systems in the opening minutes of conflict.

The Viasat attack during Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine shows how effective space-based disruption can be. Hours before Russian troops crossed the border, hackers deployed malware that crippled the KA-SAT satellite network, disabling tens of thousands of modems across Europe. The result was widespread communication outages, including within Ukraine’s military. By targeting a civilian-operated satellite system, Russia demonstrated how space-based infrastructure can be exploited for strategic gain, blinding and destabilizing an adversary before conventional warfare begins.

China has closely studied both sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and drawn key lessons about the role of space infrastructure in modern warfare. From Russia’s early cyberattack on Viasat, China saw how disrupting satellite communications can cripple an adversary’s ability to coordinate, respond, and stay connected, making satellite interference a valuable tool for preinvasion advantage. At the same time, Ukraine’s rapid pivot to SpaceX’s Starlink showed the power of resilient, decentralized megaconstellations to restore connectivity, maintain command and control, and support both military and civilian functions in real time. Together, these lessons have shaped China’s approach to space warfare: Disable your opponent’s satellites early and ensure your own communications cannot be taken offline. This thinking is reflected in China’s push to build sovereign megaconstellations like Guowang and Qianfan, not just for commercial purposes, but to guarantee wartime resilience and strategic independence in orbit.

China’s Megaconstellations

Guowang and Qianfan are China’s planned satellite megaconstellations designed to provide global internet coverage while strengthening the country’s independence and resilience in space-based communications. Guowang, meaning “national network,” is expected to include around thirteen thousand satellites and will serve as a sovereign satellite internet system, led by state-owned enterprises such as the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. It is intended to offer secure broadband services domestically and globally, akin to Starlink, reducing reliance on external or nondomestic systems, while supporting both civilian and military operations. Qianfan, meaning “thousand sails,” is a parallel constellation with roughly fourteen thousand planned satellites, a fleet of orbiting assets working in coordinated formation.

While both projects are publicly positioned as commercial and technological ventures, they are deeply dual-use, designed to enable hardened, decentralized communications that can survive wartime disruption and operate independently of Western infrastructure.

Together, Guowang and Qianfan represent more than just technological ambition. They reflect China’s broader strategy to dominate orbital infrastructure, assert digital sovereignty, and ensure command-and-control continuity in a contested, congested information environment. In any future conflict, these constellations will be as critical to Chinese power projection as aircraft carriers or missile systems, just as Starlink has become indispensable to Ukraine.

The Need for a New Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory is built on a simple premise: You prevent an adversary from taking an unwanted action (typically aggression) by making the cost of that action outweigh any potential benefit. Effective deterrence depends on three elements: capability (the ability to retaliate or respond), credibility (the ability to convince an adversary you will act), and communication (clear signaling of red lines and consequences).

A disabled satellite can be framed as a technical failure or an act of war. That ambiguity is what makes space so strategically volatile. Satellites malfunction regularly due to radiation, debris, or aging hardware. This natural uncertainty provides cover for deliberate interference. A rival state could jam, spoof, or physically disrupt a satellite while plausibly denying responsibility. But the operational impact is immediate: Intelligence is lost, communications break down, and targeting or navigation systems go dark. In a domain without clear rules of engagement or trusted verification mechanisms, a single orbital incident could spark a broader military crisis before decision-makers fully understand what happened.

As more nations deploy maneuverable satellites and integrate dual-use AI, the risk of accidental escalation is growing. In space, nearly everything is dual-use: The same satellite delivering internet or weather data may also support military surveillance or missile guidance. Without clear boundaries, even a routine orbital maneuver could be misinterpreted as a provocation, leading to real-world consequences far beyond Earth’s atmosphere.

To reduce the risk of miscalculation, new rules of engagement are urgently needed. These could include:

Space technologies and tactics that once seemed futuristic are already reshaping how wars will begin, and how they might escalate. If nations continue to rely on outdated legal frameworks and unspoken assumptions, they risk stumbling into a conflict that starts invisibly and spirals uncontrollably. Rather than vague calls for norms, what’s needed now are enforceable rules, concrete verification measures, and technical cooperation that match the speed and complexity of the modern space domain. Meeting this challenge will require sustained diplomatic engagement, multilateral commitment, and the integration of technical safeguards into the fabric of space governance. Only through proactive, collaborative governance can the international community hope to preserve space as a stable domain and prevent today’s silent risks from becoming tomorrow’s open conflicts.

DeLaine Mayer developed and teaches New York University’s first graduate course on astropolitics, “Astropolitik: The Politics, Policies, and Technologies of Outer Space,” at the Center for Global Affairs. She holds an MS in space resources from the Colorado School of Mines and an MS in global affairs from NYU. Her work explores the intersections of emerging technology, international relations, geopolitics, and space.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: NASA Johnson