On July 30, Israel assassinated Fuad Shukr, a top Hezbollah commander, in a strike in the suburbs of Beirut. Less than a day later, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismael Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran and though Israeli officials did not claim responsibility for this attack, Iran and its proxies immediately blamed Israel. These back-to-back assassinations were a blow to Iran and its security and intelligence network, not to mention a setback to its proxies. Since then, Iran has pledged to directly retaliate against Israel, threatening to escalate the Israel-Hamas conflict into an interstate war between Israel and Iran and perhaps, even worse, between Israel, the United States, and its regional allies on the one hand and Iran and its network of pseudostate proxies on the other. Almost three weeks have passed since the targeted attacks, however, and Iranian retaliation has yet to materialize. Why?
Retaliating too harshly and provoking Israel or its allies to respond might trigger an all-out regional war, something Iran does not want at this time. The regime is struggling with serious economic problems due to decades of sanctions and economic mismanagement and also is managing domestic discontent and disagreements among different political factions within the Islamic Republic. Militarily, Iran possesses a capable, but very outdated, air force and has vulnerabilities in air defense, as witnessed four months ago, when Israel was able to penetrate Iranian airspace. The balance of power in the region, as it has for decades, heavily favors Israel given its technological and military advantages—and also given its strong alliance with the United States and security cooperation with Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. The US-led defense against Iran’s unprecedented drone and missile attacks in April is testament to the strength of this broad-based coalition.
So, if Iran is not ready for a war and if it stands to lose so much from a regional conflict, then why run the risk of one? For decades, proxy groups have been seen as a strategic asset for the Islamic Republic. It has allowed Tehran to threaten regional foes, to influence other countries’ domestic politics and prop up friendly regimes (such as in Bashar al-Assad’s in Syria), to threaten maritime traffic and the vital sea lines of communication, and to deter regional and great powers from launching attacks. In short, Tehran’s proxies have allowed Iran to punch far-above its weight in the Middle East despite its lower defense expenditures relative to Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Since the horrific October 7 terrorist attacks, Iran’s alliances have forced it close ranks and support its network of proxies even when doing so might bring it into conflict with regional powers like Israel. Such entanglements cause Iran to run the risk of war not because it necessarily desires one, but because it feels obligated to respond to maintain its national honor and prestige. Though difficult to quantify, these reasons are of fundamental importance in driving allies to war as they affect the calculus of leaders who continuously seek to influence how their countries are perceived by friends as well as foes. Such considerations unfortunately may pressure Iran into retaliating even when doing so might ignite a regional war whose human, economic, and military costs far exceed any benefits for Tehran. Iran’s reputational concerns are real but just might be addressed if progress is made toward reaching a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war.
The Axis of Resistance and the Dangers of Iran’s Regional Entanglements
One might be tempted to think that the current situation resembles the crisis that unfolded back in April, but this is not the case. At that time, Iran retaliated against an Israeli attack on its diplomatic compound in Syria that killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers, including two high-ranking generals. Whereas an Iranian facility and Iranian personnel were directly targeted in April’s airstrike, the recent assassinations targeted senior officials from Iran’s network of proxies, the so-called axis of resistance. Threatening the very survival of Iran’s proxies (particularly those like Hezbollah who are religiously, ideologically, and politically aligned with Iran) is something that obviously crosses redlines for Tehran, but Israel’s targeted assassinations do not meet this threshold. They neither threaten Hamas’s or Hezbollah’s existence nor affect their capabilities and resolve. The former, for instance, already announced that it had replaced Haniyeh with Yahya Sinwar, one of the masterminds behind the heinous October terrorist attacks.
Historically, the effectiveness of targeted killings is limited, at best achieving mixed results, because terrorist groups tend to remain undeterred by the deaths of their leaders. While they help incapacitate the military and political leadership, assassinations are of limited value given that individuals are replaceable, especially in well-organized and highly structured groups. Prior assassinations of key Hamas figures, for instance, such as Yahya Ayyash (1996), Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (2004), and Abdel Aziz Rantisi (2004) had tactical and operational benefits but did not help Israel strategically. The same can be said of the United States’ killing of al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden in 2011 and ISIS’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019.
If the assassinations do not change the overall situation in the region, then why have Iranian officials repeatedly vowed to respond to Haniyeh’s killing, maintaining that it was a violation of Iran’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Publicly threatening to retaliate incurs audience costs for Iran’s leaders such that if they fail to follow through on their threats, they may be punished by political elites (especially hardliners) back home and criticized by allies in the region. Furthermore, should Iran refuse to execute its threats, its reputation will be affected such that future threats may be interpreted as bluffs. Iran has thus pushed itself into a corner.
Iran’s behavior is puzzling in light of how Tehran has previously downplayed clandestine attacks, including targeted assassinations, cyberattacks, and drone strikes on its own soil. What seemingly makes the attack on Haniyeh different is that it was directed against the head of a proxy group and took place in Iran’s capital after the target had just attended the inauguration of the country’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. Moreover, it occurred at a time when tensions have spiked after ten months of war between Hamas and Israel and months of daily attacks along the Israeli-Lebanese border between Hezbollah and Israel. The nature, timing, and place of the attack was a humiliating blow for Iran and undermined the strong, powerful image that the Islamic Republic has for decades sought to project to its allies and enemies.
The assassination therefore mattered not because it weakened Iran or its proxies but because it affected how Tehran is perceived regionally and internationally. And, as is well known in the field of international relations, states continuously seek to influence, if not manipulate, how they are viewed by other actors. To counter the image of weakness, Iran wants to clearly and unmistakably communicate strength and resolve and accordingly feels compelled to retaliate to do so.
Iran’s vast network of proxies has thus created regional entanglements, which have compounded the problem for Iran and placed additional pressure on its leaders to forcefully respond even though the country’s core interests are not threatened. Failing to retaliate against Israel may have reputational costs and undermine the credibility of future Iranian commitments. It may embolden Israel and may weaken or fracture Tehran’s alliances as its proxies question their patron and its ability to support and protect them.
But if reputation matters and if it is in fact influencing Iranian decision-making, then Tehran might very well be looking for a face-saving way out of the existing crisis. The fact that Iran has waited so long to retaliate seems to support this very argument.
Tehran’s Rationale for De-escalation
Though recent events in the Middle East have moved the region ever closer to the brink of war, this is not a foregone conclusion. Acting as if war with Iran is inevitable is dangerous and might bring about the outcome that no state truly wants—a regional conflagration. Worse still, history proves that such beliefs encourage actors to consider preemption if they feel war is imminent and absolutely nothing can be done to avert it.
Considering the situation from Iran’s point of view, we see that its officials have strong reasons for deescalating the present crisis. Perspective-taking provides insight into how Iranian officials think and the constraints through which they operate and is part of what scholars, officials, and military strategists term strategic empathy. Empathy, as used here, does not refer to showing sympathy but to merely understanding the other side’s thoughts and feelings without “having to share it on an emotional level.” It involves putting oneself into the shoes of an adversary to see the world as the adversary does and is something practiced by many notable statesmen.
Carrying out such an exercise, we see that Iran has a serious problem. It must react to maintain its reputation and restore deterrence, but the risk of another failed strike on Israel might actually harm Iran’s credibility. If Tehran responds in a similar manner as it did back in April and launches hundreds of drones and missiles that are once again largely intercepted, then it might be embarrassed, and Israel might actually be less deterred in the future. On the other hand, if Iran launches a far larger and more coordinated series of attacks, then this might successfully overwhelm Israel’s air defenses but would invite serious retaliation—dependent, of course, on whom Iran targets and the level of casualties and destruction caused by the strikes. There is absolutely no way for Iran to predict the consequences of its actions and to ascertain how the disputants may afterward climb the escalation ladder. Mistakes and miscalculations are indeed possible in such a scenario and the results might be catastrophic. Tehran does not possess any good options.
As Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz noted, conflict results from continuous interactions where multiple actors act and react to the steps taken by one another. Because disputants cannot predict with certainty how their plans will be executed, how outside factors (and actors) may intervene to disrupt those plans, and most importantly, how the other side might respond, war, in its final analysis, is riddled with uncertainty. Clausewitz wrote in On War that “the very nature of interaction is bound to make it [war] unpredictable” and, to put it succinctly, more risky. Clausewitz’s insight is as applicable today as it was in the nineteenth century and while it is difficult to discern Iran’s true intentions, it stands to reason that its officials’ cautiousness demonstrates at least some acknowledgment of this strategic calculus.
Is There a Way Out of the Crisis?
If Iran’s leaders are indeed reluctant to retaliate due to the reasons mentioned above and are still deliberating over whether and how to respond, then an off-ramp may still exist, even at this late stage. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is once again visiting the region to inject momentum into ceasefire talks so that the United States along with its Arab partners, Qatar and Egypt, can successfully mediate the Israel-Hamas conflict. Any diplomatic progress toward ending the war would undercut some of the basis for direct Iranian retaliation against Israel and would help defuse tensions along the Israeli-Lebanese border and near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Of course, there are various reasons why observers rightly expect talks to fail given that their outcome is dependent on Israel and Hamas, whose leaders possess domestic political reasons as well as strategic imperatives to either continue fighting or delay ceasefire negotiations until circumstances further ripen. Though this is the case, it is also true that war-weariness and exhaustion coupled with domestic and international pressure are moving the disputants to conclude a deal after ten months of war.
Regional tensions will potentially be lessened if progress can be made to end the Gaza war. Iran’s threats notwithstanding, preliminary reports suggest that Tehran has indeed delayed its retaliation to give time for the ceasefire negotiations to bear fruit. Progress in bringing the war to an end can allow Iran to save face and claim that it sacrificed seeking revenge for achieving regional peace and stability. Such an outcome just might resonate with its proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis, whose stated reason for threatening Israel and interrupting maritime traffic, at the moment, is the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Moreover, Hamas stands to lose from continued low-intensity conflict and Hezbollah from the outbreak of an all-out regional war. A diplomatic solution will give Iran some degree of cover to sheath its sword and claim that its threat of regional war brought about peace.
While it is very true that Iran might still retaliate regardless of whether a deal is reached, it has less incentive to do so and, at the very least, would be more inclined to scale back its retaliation with a deal than without one. Such an agreement would also serve the interests of the Middle East since no state would benefit from a complex, multifront war stretching from the Mediterranean all the way to the Persian Gulf. Diplomacy is by no means guaranteed to succeed, and might very well fail, but ought to be encouraged given that Iran possesses reasons to de-escalate.
Shahin Berenji is an assistant professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the US Naval War College. He studies foreign policy decision-making and diplomacy/diplomatic history and has a specialization in the Cold War and regional expertise in the Middle East. His research has been published in such academic journals as International Security and Security Studies and his commentary has been featured online with the Modern War Institute, the National Interest, and E-International Relations.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval War College, the Departments of the Army or Navy, or the Department of Defense.
Image credit: Tasnim News Agency, via Wikimedia Commons