In the Lord of the Rings universe, Sauron sought dominion over Middle-earth by using overwhelming military force and superior technology—the one ring to rule them all. Once the ring was taken from him, he was temporarily defeated, but the geopolitical landscape eventually reverted to a lengthy stalemate. In the real world, scholarship is vivisecting the war in Ukraine to identify the one ring—the key to securing victory in the next conflict and achieving objectives in strategic competition. For instance, a recent monograph from the Institute for the Study of War makes a compelling case for the “tactical reconnaissance strike complex,” a synthesis of old-school military platforms integrated with drones to create the pinnacle of dominant battlespace knowledge.
However, this quest for the one ring is likely to end in anticlimax. There is no ring of power that will assure victory in future conflicts and investing time and effort in questing after one will only lead to frustration at best—and mass casualties at worst—in the next conflict. The chief problem with this quest is that it myopically focuses attention on the battlefields and not the greater strategic picture. This explains, in part, why the recent Ukrainian counteroffensive has been so surprising and successful. Winning a war is not about battlefield victories; it is about control.
To understand why, we must turn to the brilliant work of J. C. Wylie. Why he is not mentioned in the same breath as Clausewitz, Corbett, and Mahan is beyond me. Wylie was a US Navy officer who gained a reputation not only as a leader—he commanded four ships as he rose to two-star flag rank—but also as a thinker, writer, and strategist. His most famous work, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, published in 1967, should be required reading for anyone looking to contribute to multidomain strategy or national defense policy. While Clausewitz, Jomini, and Corbett write theories for practicing war, Wylie’s is a theory for understanding the phenomenon. Its universal applicability makes it foundational for red-teaming and setting strategic objectives rather than running military operations. Its relevance is so broad, in fact, that it accurately describes the competition over Middle-earth as effectively as the war in Ukraine.
War is always a means to an end, and not an end itself. Defeating the enemy on the battlefield is only useful if it is fungible; it must be leveraged into some sort of political value. Wylie writes:
The primary aim of the strategist in the conduct of war is some selected degree of control of the enemy for the strategist’s own purpose; this is achieved by control of the pattern of war; and this control of the pattern of war is had by manipulation of the center of gravity of war to the advantage of the strategist and the disadvantage of the opponent.
When neither side controls the pattern of war, the war achieves a state of equilibrium (i.e., entrenched positions, indirect fire strikes, and as the Institute for the Study of War monograph mentioned above notes, a general absence of maneuver). To break the equilibrium, one side must seize the initiative, which generally requires surprising tactics. The free peoples of Middle-earth did this when they unleashed their hobbits, and Ukraine changed its strategic paradigm by opening a new campaign.
Underpinning Wylie’s theory of power control are four assumptions, some of which can be hard to hear, not least for those who seek the one ring that will guarantee battlefield victory.
Assumption 1: “Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be war.”
Although somewhat fatalistic, this assumption has unfortunately been validated by the historic record. Hence Vegetius’s iconic phrase: “Si vis pacem, para bellum.” Defeating Sauron in the Second Age was not the end of history in Middle-earth. He rose to power once more to terrorize a fragmented, unprepared land. Similarly, Ukraine’s war with Russia traces farther back than a few years, let alone 2014. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many believed that they were witnessing the end of history. Democracy no longer had a nemesis. Then, Russia progressively rebuilt its power base and became increasingly aggressive, culminating in the ongoing conflict today.
Assumption 2: “The aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy.”
This might seem superficially axiomatic, but anyone who has read Wylie’s work will appreciate that his ideas about control contain nuances much deeper than this superficial level. And in any case, this assumption is a clear reminder that the battlefields are not the focal point for victory. Defeating an enemy on the battlefield does not automatically yield strategic dividends. More is required to coerce or compel an enemy into a desired outcome. In the world of the Lord of the Rings, Mordor maintained its sovereignty and was left undisturbed for an age. In the real world, this assumption has been proven by Ukraine’s refusal to willingly concede occupied territory unless Russia is able to push harder than it has until now.
Assumption 3: “We cannot predict with any certainty the pattern of the war for which we prepare ourselves.”
The United States has a history of conflating better weapons with better war outcomes—to its detriment. Each military asset is always developed within the context of the last war, not the next, but the next war will likely be different from the last, and potentially drastically so. The one ring did not assure victory in the end. Similarly, there were few experts who recognized that World War I–style trench warfare supplemented with high-tech, low-cost drones was the form that the Russia-Ukraine warfare would take. It is hard to conceive that two and a half years ago, most believed that this conflict would be short and decisive. Yet, surprisingly, Ukraine is now in the strongest strategic positions it has been in since the initial invasion.
Assumption 4: “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun.”
The world is still a long way off from the first conflict with humans removed from the battlefield. Better warriors and tactical leaders with better training can be the difference between success or failure. Were it not for the hobbits, the Third Age would have been a much darker one. Ukraine, too, has confronted the harsh reality of this assumption as it has sought to train enough personnel to maintain its war effort, dealt with conscription challenges, and fought to maintain unit morale among those on the front lines, directly engaged with the Russian enemy. What is more, the sheer quantity of Russian conscripts taken as prisoners of war indicates a major disparity in morale, motivation, and discipline between the two forces, giving Ukraine an additional edge which is difficult to calculate.
Military Strategy is a fairly short read, but well worth the time to understand Wylie’s theory of power control. There is no other paradigm that so perfectly describes warfare—whether in Middle-earth or Ukraine—and frames the challenges awaiting a force that will engage in a battle of control across multiple domains in the next war. It does not tell you how to win a campaign, but for any strategic problem it offers an accurate context from which to start planning. Go read it.
Joe McGiffin is a staff officer at the Modern War Institute and a senior instructor for the Defense and Strategic Studies undergraduate program in the Department of Military Instruction. He researches and teaches strategic decision-making, wargaming, and joint warfare theory.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Sorry, I still believe in Von Clausewitz. Regarding the war in Ukraine, one side has published its objectives (Von Clausewitz principle) and the other's is, "as long as it takes." (Not a Von Clausewitz Principle) Tell me, which side is currently pulling off the shelf and not reserves?