Beginning in February 2022, the world watched as the largest land war in Europe since World War II consumed men and material at a prodigious rate. Since the beginning of the war, the administration of President Joe Biden clearly stated that Russia’s unprovoked aggression would not stand and that the United States would support Ukraine “as long as it takes.” As the war approaches the end of its third year and with speculation about a possible negotiated settlement, it is appropriate to assess the US strategy. Since much depends on the conflict’s final outcome, consider this a pre-postmortem.

Joint doctrine defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” The US Army War College defines it as “the alignment of ends (aims, objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)—informed by risk—to attain goals.” Regardless of which definition we use, there is a fundamental truth: ultimately, strategy serves policy, and thus, the most obvious way to assess strategy is by asking whether it achieves the policy outcomes at acceptable cost and levels of risk.

The Strategy: Ends

At the Army War College, we teach students that strategy begins with an understanding of national interests. The US National Security Strategy identifies a number of interests directly tied to the Russian war in Ukraine. These include the defense of democracy and countering of autocracies globally, upholding and promoting a rules-based international order that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, and the maintenance of a strong and unified NATO as part of a global network of alliances and partnerships. Of course, the war and its outcome also have real implications for strategic competition and the balance of power—not only regionally, but globally, as well. One of the most frequently cited concerns is what lessons President Xi Jinping and the People’s Republic of China are learning from this conflict and how that might impact Beijing’s decisions about invading Taiwan.

Since 2022, these national interests have informed US policy objectives for Ukraine. These policy objectives can be summarized as: Ukraine able to defend itself and Russia denied strategic success, further Russian aggression deterred, and direct conflict between Russia and the United States or NATO avoided. In a 2022 op-ed in the New York Times, President Biden stated clearly: “America’s goal is straightforward: We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression.”

In 2022, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Mark Milley, described the US strategic objectives (or ends) as:

No. 1: “Don’t have a kinetic conflict between the U.S. military and NATO with Russia.”
No. 2: “Contain war inside the geographical boundaries of Ukraine.”
No. 3: “Strengthen and maintain NATO unity.”
No. 4: “Empower Ukraine and give them the means to fight.”

These strategic objectives align with the desired policy outcomes and further clarify the priorities. Before the failed 2023 Ukrainian offensive, the United States appeared supportive of Ukraine’s desire to drive Russia from the occupied territories. However, since the failed offensive, it appears increasingly focused on better posturing Ukraine for a negotiated settlement.

The above policy and strategic objectives are laudable and have remained relatively static throughout the conflict—certainly since the 2023 failed Ukrainian offensive. Thus, implementation has appeared to prioritize avoidance of a direct conflict with Russia and preventing Russian success. This prioritization is almost certainly due to concerns with the risk of escalation—something that will become more evident as we look at the ways and means in the next section. Notably, this prioritization has led critics to argue the strategy lacks a clear vision or end-state, setting conditions for a prolonged war.

The Strategy: Ways and Means

The United States has employed multiple elements of national power—diplomatic, information, economic, and military—to pursue these ends. Summarizing work by retired Major General Mick Ryan and Dr. Kori Schake, the main elements of the US approach (ways) are:

1. providing military and economic assistance to Ukraine;
2. rallying international military and economic support for Ukraine;
3. imposing economic sanctions and isolating Russia diplomatically; and
4. deploying forces to assure allies and deter further Russian aggression.

The Biden administration has marshaled significant resources (means) to support the strategy. This includes the deployment of additional forces to Europe, the use of the presidential drawdown authority and working with Congress to pass the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and the use of diplomatic capital to isolate Russia economically and diplomatically. Let’s now examine strategy implementation and assess its success.

Direct Military and Economic Assistance for Ukraine

As of September 2024, the United States Congress had authorized $175 billion in aid to Ukraine, and Europe another $253 billion. This aid has been instrumental to Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war effort, something acknowledged by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy when he noted that Ukraine would lose the war without US aid, and prevented Russia from achieving a rapid victory. Additionally, the military support for Ukraine is revitalizing the defense industrial base and enhancing the US capacity for waging great power conflict. As of October 2024, for example, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and the Biden administration’s use of presidential drawdown authority have resulted in at least $46.3 billion in obligations to defense industry partners and around $5 billion in direct investment to improve defense industry capacity across the United States. Finally, this aid has directly contributed to the imposition of 600,000–700,000 Russian casualties and the destruction of large portions of Russia’s strategic material reserves.

However, this aid has proven insufficient for Ukraine to push Russian forces back, and Russian forces continue to make slow, if costly, gains. Critics of the strategy highlight its incremental approach and restrictions on aid due to fear of escalation as being responsible for missed opportunities, increased casualties, and a prolonging of the conflict. Additionally, critics note concerns with resource allocation, asserting that resources used to support Ukraine put the United States’ ability to deal with China as the “pacing threat” at risk. Amplifying this argument, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, recently highlighted concerns that aid to Ukraine may impact his force’s readiness and ability to respond to China. Overall, economic and military aid has proven, at best, only partially successful.

Rally Others to Support Ukraine

Even before the war began, the United States sought to rally international backing to deter Russia and generate support for Ukraine through the sharing of declassified intelligence and overt messaging of Russia’s plans and intentions. These efforts enabled Ukraine to endure Russia’s initial invasion and contributed to the willingness of international partners to aid Ukraine. The establishment of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, involving over forty countries, and the authorization of hundreds of billions in aid to Ukraine illustrate these efforts. Despite this success, critics note that the United States is bearing a disproportionate share of the burden given the inability of European defense forces and infrastructure to meet Ukraine’s requirements. Overall, America’s ability to rally others to support Ukraine’s cause is one of the more successful elements of the strategy, yet it has only been partially successful, given the failure of those countries to fully mobilize their resources in support of Ukraine.

Impose Sanctions and Isolate Russia

Diplomatic and information efforts to isolate Russia were effective at the outset. Symbolizing these early efforts, 141 countries (out of 193) voted to condemn Russia’s invasion in the UN General Assembly, and countries expelled or suspended Moscow from a variety of international institutions. Economically, the United States and its partners have imposed thousands of sanctions on Russian entities, constraining the Russian defense industry and driving interest rates to 21 percent, with the potential to go higher.

However, over time, these efforts have proven less decisive than hoped. Today, only forty-five countries directly sanction Russia, and Russia has proven quite capable of mitigating the worst effects of these sanctions. Moscow is increasingly strengthening its relationship and cooperation with the axis of upheaval (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea) out of necessity and shared interest. For these reasons, this element of the strategy has proven least successful. More importantly, if it leads to the long-term strengthening of the axis of upheaval, it could be seen as counterproductive for the US position in the world.

Deploying Forces to Assure Allies and Deter Russia

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States announced the deployment of an additional seven thousand troops to Europe and supported NATO’s activation of its Rapid Response Force. In addition, Congress appropriated another $45 billion to support US military operations in Europe and other government responses to the war. Today, the United States maintains approximately eighty thousand personnel in Europe and is a key contributor to the enhanced NATO force posture along the alliance’s eastern flank. Perhaps most importantly, thirteen member nations are providing a larger percentage of their GDP in aid to Ukraine than the United States—certainly in part because they are confident in the United States’ commitment to NATO. Despite this, it is necessary to acknowledge Russia is waging a campaign of subversion against the West that could inadvertently escalate. Thus, this element is clearly the most successful of the strategy.

Overall Assessment

So, has the US strategy been successful? Given the aspirational goals, the short answer is no, but the full answer is slightly more nuanced and partly dependent on the war’s final outcome.

Throughout the war, the United States’ principal concern has been the risk of escalation or direct conflict with Russia. From the beginning, the Biden administration has been very clear about its desire to avoid World War III and has acted deliberately as a result. The conflict has remained largely contained to Ukraine and certainly imposed significant costs on the Russians—including the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO. Supporters of the strategy will argue that US leadership, along with fear of a more aggressive Russia, has strengthened NATO unity and mutual commitment, with twenty-three member nations (up from just three in 2014) spending more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, ensuring a stronger and more unified NATO as part of a global network of alliances. In these terms, the strategy has been quite successful, although the Ukrainians would certainly argue that it is at far too high of a cost.

However, critics claim pursuing a “Goldilocks strategy” that seeks to support Ukraine without provoking Russia has enabled Ukraine to survive but not to win, allowing Russia to adapt over time and regain the strategic initiative. Thus, despite short-term success, the strategy’s long-term prospects appear increasingly uncertain. More importantly, concerns about escalation must be balanced against the implications of Russian success in Ukraine. General Christopher Cavoli, commander of US European Command, testified to Congress in April that failure to support Ukraine would embolden Russia and threaten the global security environment, while administration officials have frequently cited the threat to a rules-based international order if Russia succeeds in Ukraine.

When assessed against the overall policy outcome of an independent and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend against further aggression, the strategy clearly fails. Since the unsuccessful 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, both sides have struggled to make operational-level gains on the battlefield. However, in 2024, Russia’s superiority in resources, its willingness to expend men and materiel, and uncertainty about continued United States support led many to see the conflict as trending toward a settlement that will allow Russia to retain control over occupied areas of Ukraine. While Ukraine survives, the Ukrainian economy is currently at 78 percent of its prewar size. Further, it is running a $38 billion annual budget deficit and was estimated to require $486 billion in reconstruction spending as of December 2023. Given this, it is hard to imagine an economically prosperous Ukraine with the resources to defend itself in the near term.

Without an end in sight more than half of Ukrainians polled now believe Ukraine should seek a negotiated end to the conflict, and over half of those are willing to make territorial concessions to make this a reality. This likely reflects a growing exhaustion on the part of the Ukrainian people with the costs of the war. While a future settlement could lead to the type of Ukraine desired by current policy, it is hard to argue that the US strategy is on a trajectory to accomplish that today.

While the US strategy has avoided direct conflict and prevented near-term Russian success, it has failed to achieve the overall policy objective of a free Ukraine capable of defending itself or deterring future Russian aggression. What happens next will go a long way toward how historians see the strategy—did it buy time for Ukraine while effectively managing the risk of escalation and conflict or did it squander resources in an adventure that could not succeed given an acceptable level of risk?

Lessons for Aspiring Strategists and Policymakers

The war in Ukraine underscores a fundamental truth about strategy: it is as much about navigating uncertainty and managing risks as it is about achieving goals. Three key lessons stand out from this case.

First, a good strategy requires the alignment of ends, ways, and means informed by consideration of risk. The current approach illustrates the importance of setting realistic goals and calibrating resources and actions to achieve those goals.

Second, strategy is a dynamic process, not a static plan. Effective strategy requires continuous adaptation. Strategists must cultivate intellectual flexibility to avoid becoming anchored to initial goals or assumptions and adjust their strategy based on the evolving environment. Ultimately, strategy is not about creating a rigid plan to achieve one’s goals but maintaining the agility to navigate complex and unpredictable environments.

Finally, risk management is at the core of strategic thinking. Strategy is a competitive activity and, as such, always involves risk. The art of strategy lies in calibrating actions to achieve outcomes while mitigating the potential negative consequences of action. Successful strategists must have the capacity to make difficult trade-offs and understand that every strategic decision involves inherent uncertainties.

As Lawrence Freedman notes, there is a difference between having a strategy and acting strategically—in other words, between strategy as a thing and strategy as an action. The Ukraine conflict is a profound reminder that strategy is less a destination and more a continuous process of adaption, learning, and careful navigation of goals, resources, and risks. Ultimately, strategists or policymakers must constantly evaluate their strategies and adjust the ends, ways, or means as necessary based on their risk tolerance.

Colonel Chase Metcalf is an assistant professor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the Army War College and deputy director for the Ukraine War Integrated Research Project.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Army War College, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Chad J. McNeeley, DoD