Over the weekend, Bashar al-Assad’s reign came to an end after rebels overwhelmed government forces. The rebels’ victory punctuated the lightning gains they made largely over the past two weeks. Since late November, rebel forces took Syria’s second-largest city, Aleppo, before going on to claim Hama and Homs and encircling Damascus—prompting Assad to flee the country and marking an end to the fifty-three-year-long Assad family rule.
The regime change in Damascus has profound if not yet fully appreciated geopolitical implications for the region. From the very start, the civil war in Syria has been complex—with few heroes and many victims—in part owing to the vast involvement of outside players with varying degrees of influence and objectives. These actors have lots to lose, potentially win, or figure out in a post-Assad Middle East.
Intervention in Syria by foreign actors long predates the country’s civil war. Over decades, both direct and indirect intervention—through support for (or opposition to) the Assad regime—has left various foreign actors with relative levels of influence in Syria. These include Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, the United States, Europe (particularly through the activities of France), and Israel. Figure 1 plots the rise and fall of formal bilateral influence capacity in Syria for these foreign countries (per the FBIC index).
Just as the Soviet Union had by far the most foreign influence over the Syrian Ba’ath regime during the Cold War, Russia had reestablished Moscow’s dominant share of bilateral influence in Syria during the recent civil war, though Russia’s influence capacity in Syria has declined steadily in recent years.
Russia is not alone in seeing its influence decrease. Indeed, as Syria’s economy shrank and its international trade dwindled due to Western sanctions, the influence capacity of most outside powers has fallen. Turkey is the only surveyed country that has actually seen its influence capacity in Syria rise in recent years. Which actors will manage to salvage a measure of influence with a new regime in Damascus remains to be seen. But each of them faces a unique set of implications from Assad’s fall.
The Rebels
After Bashar al-Assad’s father Hafez had part of Hama leveled in 1982 to brutally repress a Muslim Brotherhood uprising, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously observed that, for Syria, Middle Eastern politics was played by “Hama rules”—that is, no rules at all. Assad managed to stay in power through fourteen years of civil war by following Hama rules. But his capacity to repress and instill fear ultimately foundered. And Hama got its revenge.
The rebels are a conglomerate of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—previously the Nusra Front—the Syrian National Army, and other smaller opposition groups that banded together to take advantage of the regime’s decreasing external support. HTS is led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—a US-designated terrorist who had ties to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Syria, designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the US State Department in 1979, is now evidently in the hands of Jolani. While Jolani previously stated that there was no room for Syria’s non-Sunni minorities, he may be trying to rebrand as a moderate, which could help him consolidate power. Many uncertainties remain, as the rebels have yet to form a government, appoint a foreign minister, or signal with whom they intend to cooperate.
Russia
Assad’s fall is a big blow to Moscow, which had been one of Assad’s most steadfast backers. Russian forces are at best distracted, and at worst stretched thin, by their primary focus in Ukraine. Assad’s fall reveals that Russia cannot fight two conflicts at one time.
While Russia conducted limited strikes on Aleppo toward the end of November as rebels were rapidly making gains in the area, it may have calculated that it could not deploy with enough strength and coordination to curtail rebel advances. Or possibly, Moscow might have harbored concerns that unlike its intervention beginning in September 2015, which required a massive and indiscriminate campaign to stop the rebels, it was not currently in its strategic interests to try to militarily rescue Assad again given the damage Moscow’s reputation has taken due to Ukraine. Maybe a bit of both. Either way, by the time Assad fled, Russia had already begun moving warships from Tartus, its only naval base on the Mediterranean, close to a week earlier, signaling it was beginning to cut its losses in Syria. Russia also maintained an air base in Syria, which it used to resupply its Africa operations. The probable loss of these bases is likely to hinder its ability to project power and support partners globally. Furthermore, its perceived unwillingness or inability to save Assad may lead some of its partners, particularly in Africa, to question Moscow’s capacity and dedication.
Iran
Of all the foreign actors, Iran is probably most affected by the recent events in Syria. Unlike Russia, Iran has few other options for partnerships, and the collapse of the Assad regime is a major loss for Tehran’s “axis of resistance.” Damascus was previously Tehran’s closest regional ally, to whom it provided strategic guidance, diplomatic support, intelligence, weapons, and fighters. Tehran also viewed its relationship with the Assad regime largely as a means to project Shia power and influence in the region. Moreover, Iran used Syria to store and move weapons to its militias, including Hezbollah. HTS and other elements of the opposition reportedly killed several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force advisers and stormed the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Iranian officials claim that Tehran is in direct contact with rebel leadership in an attempt to prevent further deterioration of the relationship. Though it is unclear how a new regime will choose to engage, or not, with Tehran, it most likely will be considerably less than Assad’s engagement. Without Syria, Iran’s ability to project force in the region—particularly to continue providing materiel support to Hezbollah—would be significantly diminished, which in turn is likely to undermine Hezbollah during the group’s most significant conflict with Israel since 2006. This would weaken Iran’s standing in the region and hinder its ability to achieve its own strategic objectives, to include challenging Israel.
Turkey
Turkey tends to prioritize efforts to weaken the Kurds, so it is not surprising that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan came out last week and stated publicly that he hoped for a rebel advance to Damascus, though he caveated the remarks with some concern about the composition of the rebel force. Turkey backs the Syrian National Army, an umbrella organization for several opposition groups fighting both Assad and the Kurds—who joined HTS and others in the fighting to upset the Syrian regime. Turkey backs the group because of its fixation on the Kurds—but depending on how things play out in the coming months, Turkey could be looking at additional refugees and further instability on its border. Turkey lists HTS as a terrorist organization, but at times has operated alongside of the group and almost certainly views this as an opportunity to enhance its targeting of perceived threats stemming from the Syrian Kurds.
China
Beijing has been willing to do (economic) business with the Assad regime but had no major ideological affinity with or security commitments to it. Pragmatically, we expect Beijing to be willing to do business with the post-Assad regime as well. Last year, Beijing and Damascus announced a “strategic partnership”—Syria is part of China’s Belt and Road initiative—and China has backed the Assad regime at the United Nations. While China is calling for a political resolution in Syria, it remains to be seen whether or not rebels will want to continue to work closely with Beijing.
Israel
The Assad regime’s demise was likely made possible, in part, because Israel has significantly weakened Hezbollah over the past several months. The group was unable to rescue Assad this time around. Hezbollah fighters previously joined the fight in Syria but have suffered diminished capabilities recently in fighting with Israel. Over the last decade, Israel had launched airstrikes against Iranian-linked forces in Syria. Over the weekend, Israel targeted chemical weapons sites and long-range rockets in order to prevent their seizure by rebels, and took control of a buffer zone inside Syria. With the downfall of the regime, Iran’s diminished ability to support its anti-Israel proxies undoubtedly is a win for Israel and may embolden Israel as it continues battles on two of its borders. However, it remains to be seen whether HTS, given its own anti-Israel agenda, will shift focus to its neighbor assuming it can consolidate order in Syria.
United States
The United States currently maintains a presence of about nine hundred soldiers in Syria at al-Tanf garrison—strategically located in the country’s east, near the Iraq and Jordan borders. Despite the conclusion of Operation Inherent Resolve, al-Tanf serves as a location for Washington to continue efforts to counter ISIS and Iran-backed militias and exert influence in the region. Its geographic position, which is relatively isolated from rebel force strongholds, could mean it is not an immediate target for rebels—but this could be a moot point as President-elect Donald Trump may choose to close the garrison. In December 2018, then-President Trump had ordered most US troops to be removed from Syria. Only bureaucratic “shell games” by Department of Defense leaders and Ambassador Jim Jeffries maintained the US footprint.
Europe
France, the United Kingdom, and many other European countries opposed the Assad regime, and both the EU and the UK have sanctioned Damascus. However, European states also have a major interest in stemming the refugee crisis that had driven waves of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers into their countries. There are over one million Syrian refugees in Europe, most in Germany. Thousands of Syrian refugees in Europe have rejoiced at the fall of Assad, but it is unclear if any can safely return to Syria anytime soon. European countries are likely to prioritize efforts that would help repatriate refugees safely back to Syria. Some countries, namely Germany and Austria, have stopped processing Syrian asylum applications.
There are many unknowns at this point, but perhaps the biggest is Jolani’s intent, if he is able to fully consolidate power. What is certain is that the Assad era has come to an end, and the regime’s demise has inflicted serious damage to both Iranian and Russian power projection in the region. What comes next will depend on Jolani’s ability to lead the country, salvage institutions, rebuild infrastructure, and develop a foreign policy agenda—for better, or worse.
Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She has fifteen years of experience working to support policy and analyzing national security issues. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University, including Writing for Political Science and Policy, Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa, and In the News: Analysis of Current National Security Priorities.
John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état (2022), which was named one of the “Best Historical Materials” published in 2022–23 by the American Library Association.
Sydney Laite served as a senior intelligence officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency, where she worked for fifteen years, primarily focused on Middle East issues. She holds a master of science in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University. Sydney is currently an intelligence analyst with Pinkerton Risk Management.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
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