While most Americans are aware of the debate over a security-for-resources deal with Ukraine, far fewer know of a similar proposal that has quietly emerged in the heart of Africa.

Under pressure from the administration of President Donald Trump, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its longtime adversary, Rwanda, signed a declaration of principles on April 25, which includes expectations of significant US public and private sector investment in the region. This move comes amid a rapidly deteriorating security situation that prompted the president of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, to send a letter to President Trump soliciting a formal security pact in exchange for access to critical mineral reserves.

On paper, a deal with the DRC may look desirable, even logical: access to resources, dislodging Chinese influence, and an opportunity to create stability to enhance investment. In reality, this deal looks more like a trap. Washington risks marching straight into a proxy war in some of Africa’s deadliest terrain.

The DRC is no stranger to conflict. From 1998 to 2003, the country was rocked by the bloodiest war since World War II, the Second Congolese War, a conflict most Americans have never heard of and that never really ended. Today’s conflict is witnessing surging violence; it is a tinderbox that has already drawn in nations like Rwanda and South Africa, with the former country being responsible for much of this uptick.

In recent months, M23, a Rwandan-backed rebel group, has surged through the country’s eastern provinces, capturing the city of Goma in January and triggering a spiraling humanitarian crisis. The DRC’s east is both its most volatile region and its most valuable. Much of the country’s critical mineral reserves can be found here—approximately 60 percent of global coltan reserves and 70 percent of cobalt worldwide.

Critical Minerals

Cobalt, coltan, and other rare earth metals and magnets are critical components in semiconductors and lithium-ion batteries that power electric vehicles, smartphones, and advanced weapons systems. Today, China controls about 70 percent of global cobalt refining capacity and dominates much of the supply chain through long-term contracts and embedded mining operations in Africa, particularly pursuing such resources in the DRC.

With a US-China trade war brewing, the Chinese government has blocked international exports of critical minerals and magnets, and the United States is seeking direct access to Africa’s raw material sources.

Tshisekedi’s offer is as much about pivoting away from economic overdependence on China as it is about security. Beijing’s deep involvement in the DRC’s mineral marketplace drove up extraction to a point that the government tried to restrict exports to stabilize prices. Tshisekedi has consistently attempted to renegotiate mining contracts with China since taking office, viewing previous deals as unfair to his country’s interests. Beyond economics, China’s brand of resource extraction includes child labor, human rights violations and abuse, and widespread environmental destruction—yet, it’s unclear whether humanitarian concerns play into the DRC’s calculus. In this context, Kinshasa’s outreach to Washington may be as much about economic leverage as security cooperation.

A Risky Engagement

While the precise shape of any US security commitment—specifically whether military personnel would play a role—is not determined, it’s worth noting that US forces have deployed to the DRC before, but at a much different level. In August 2021, Tshisekedi authorized the deployment of US special operations forces to assist the DRC army in combating the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a group with links to the Islamic State that is designated a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. That mission reportedly aimed to bolster efforts in the Virunga and Garamba national parks that had “become a sanctuary for terrorist forces.”

The 2021 mission was limited to a few dozen personnel for a few weeks. The scope of US involvement in the transactional proposal on the table today is less clear, but it is likely that the United States would need a substantial commitment to capitalize on the terms of the deal. The dense jungle, limited infrastructure, shifting allegiances, and decades of conflict experience among armed groups like M23 offer poor odds for a quick or clean deployment. Like previous conflicts, US officials could find themselves the victims of mission creep, convinced that just one more escalation will achieve the desired results.

There is also the risk of significant political blowback should an American military assistance mission fail. The domestic reaction to American personnel captured or killed in a conflict over critical minerals in the DRC would be swift and vitriolic. In 2017, four Green Berets were killed in Niger during an ambush—an event that shocked the public and Congress, and exposed how little Americans knew about their military’s footprint in Africa. A deployment to the DRC risks a similar dynamic, but on a far larger scale. Deployed personnel would be stepping into a web of insurgency, foreign interference, and unresolved regional rivalries. And with Chinese mining operations and security guards still active in cobalt-rich areas, the prospect of a diplomatic or kinetic confrontation is real.

There are alternative calls to avoid these risks by leaving the actual fighting to mercenaries. Reports note that Erik Prince, founder of the controversial private military company Blackwater, has been in contact with DRC officials to offer private security solutions. In late April The Africa Report claimed that he made a deal with the DRC government to work on logistics and tax collection, although his history with Blackwater would suggest that he has bigger plans for the region.

Mercenary deployments might be more palatable to the American public, but private solutions have failed before. From 2022 to 2025, European private security firms provided training and military assistance to the DRC army in Goma. Several hundred Romanian contractors led by Horatiu Potra, a former French legionnaire and well-traveled mercenary, deployed across eastern DRC to conduct tasks like airport security. However, M23 surrounded and captured nearly 300 of these troops when Goma was taken in January. The mercenaries were paraded in front of the media before being led away first to Rwanda and then back to Romania. The case provides a very real warning to American interventionists seeking to outsource conflicts abroad.

A Complicated Partner?

Working in the DRC would be tricky even if there wasn’t an ongoing conflict. Factors that make it an attractive node in a critical mineral supply strategy, such as resource abundance and a transactional head of state, also make it a risky place to do business. Corruption is endemic, regulatory enforcement is weak, executive authority is limited, and many of the key actors in the mineral economy have ties to regional militias or foreign powers. While US companies are apparently safe from legal restrictions on bribery for the time being given Washington’s pause on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, malfeasance does not form a stable basis for an economic partnership.

Moreover, China is unlikely to leave quietly. Chinese firms have embedded themselves deeply into the mining industry and offer a wider range of services, from infrastructure to arms sales. And nothing about Tshisekedi’s offer solves the core problem of insecurity in eastern DRC. It merely shifts the burden to Americans.

Ensuring that US companies have the resources they need to continue their work is important, but so is avoiding costly entanglements. This means being clear-eyed about what a US security commitment to the DRC actually entails. If history is any guide, external powers that overestimate their leverage, or misestimate the complexities of insecurity in the country rarely exit unscathed. As the new administration finds its footing in Africa, it should tread lightly in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s eastern bloodlands.

Dr. Christopher M. Faulkner is an assistant professor at the US Naval War College and nonresident senior fellow with the Eurasia program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His research focuses on militant recruitment, private military companies, and national/international security. X: @C_Faulkner_UCF

Raphael Parens is an international security researcher focused on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. He is a Templeton Fellow in the Eurasia and Africa programs at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He specializes in African security, paramilitary groups, and Eurasian security. He received his MA in international security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and he is currently based in London. X: @MoreSecurityInt

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews, a former analyst at the US Department of Defense, and an intelligence instructor for Grey Dynamics. His research focuses on the use of force by small states and drones in modern warfare. X: @Plichta_Marcel

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including the US Naval War College.

Image credit: Al Jazeera English