For twenty months, Russia’s 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies ground toward Lyman, a small city in eastern Ukraine that sits on a critical road and railway juncture. By seizing it, Russia would gain a crucial logistics hub to sustain its campaign to encircle the Fortress Belt, the cities anchoring Ukraine’s defense in Donetsk. But in May, Ukraine’s 3rd Corps launched Operation Vivaldi. In just a few weeks, Ukraine collapsed the Russian salient, encircled elements of the 2nd and 14th Motorized Rifle Divisions, and liberated up to 250 square kilometers of land.
The Ukrainian corps performed this masterpiece by achieving drone dominance over Russian forces. Provided with two brigades from Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, 3rd Corps saturated Russian rear areas with drones. One Russian military blogger reported how a considerable number of Ukrainian Hornet drones, which operate more than 150 kilometers behind Russian lines, attacked river crossings, disrupted logistics, and prevented reinforcements. These strikes isolated the Russian forces and, as their logistics system collapsed, prevented them from receiving the personnel, parts, and energy needed to effectively operate their own drones.
Remarkably, 3rd Corps reported that its forces neutralized Rubicon, Russia’s elite drone unit, “destroying its logistics, ammunition depots, drone launch sites and newly formed units and killing their experienced drone operators.” To prevent its complete loss, Russia withdrew Rubicon from the Lyman axis. Blinded, Russia was vulnerable to the Ukrainian counterattack.
A Composition for Victory
Operation Vivaldi was built on a months-long crescendo of preparation. It demonstrated how Ukraine might achieve an operational-level breakthrough on the contemporary battlefield. Only such a decisive Ukrainian battlefield victory will force Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian elites, and the common Russian soldier to reappraise the war. Such a victory will be difficult and risky, but Ukraine has no substitute to alter Russia’s strategic calculus.
Recent stories from Ukraine often focus on attritional exchange rates or the spectacle of strategic strikes, but neither offer a path to peace. For two years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were commanded by Oleksandr Syrskyi, who pursued a narrow, attritional approach to war. He focused on simple metrics like minor territorial changes and loss ratios. While stemming the tide of Russia’s advance, he did not provide an overall theory of victory to change the war’s dynamics. In certain contexts, such an attritional approach makes sense, but in the long run, Ukraine will struggle to maintain the loss ratios required to exhaust Russia’s overwhelming advantage in manpower and material. Attritional approaches should not be an end in themselves but rather should shape the battlefield to create a situation that allows a breakthrough.
Similarly, the strategic strike campaign should be viewed as a supporting operation to the front. As Robert Pape has argued, strategic bombing is effective when it targets an enemy’s military strategy, not its economy. When Ukraine severs critical links in the Russian defense-industrial chain, that is productive. When it strikes oil refineries, if that disrupts energy delivery to the front, that is also productive. When it strikes the warehouses of a large online retailer, it is cathartic, but it may not be a productive use of limited resources. Among the Russian people, such attacks could produce more resentment for Ukraine than blame for Putin’s leadership. They will not influence the momentum of the battlefield.
For this war to end, Russians will need to understand that the momentum of the battlefield has shifted and that to continue the war will risk losing everything Russia has seized since 2014. To alter Russian perspectives, Russia will need to face a military collapse, as it did in 1905 and 1917. Ukraine will have to envision Vivaldi on a grander scale. Kyiv must mobilize Ukrainian society and its international partners toward achieving a more dramatic victory.
That victory will require an operational-level breakthrough, in which Ukrainian forces would penetrate Russian lines and rapidly exploit deep into Russian rear areas. Only through exploitation can a tactical victory transform into a decisive, operational victory. In Ukraine, as in warfare throughout the last century, once both adversaries establish continuous defenses in depth, opportunities for exploitation become elusive as both sides shore up their vulnerabilities and can mass combat power on any breakthrough attempt. Until now, opportunities for deep exploitation have only presented themselves when the enemy has lacked a prepared defense, such as with Russia’s initial southern offensive or Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive and Kursk offensive.
While Ukraine and Russia struggle to overcome today’s stalemate, it is valuable to recall that militaries were thinking through the same problem after World War I. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Germans developed what became popularly known as blitzkrieg to exploit surprise and tempo to defeat enemy forces before they could develop a defense in depth. At the same time, American officers at Fort Leavenworth continuously wargamed how to penetrate an enemy defense and maintain momentum for an exploitation. But the deepest body of work on how to overcome a continuous defense in depth appeared in Soviet military thought. Before Joseph Stalin’s purges, officers like Vladimir Triandafillov, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and Georgii Isserson conceptualized how to achieve an operational-level breakthrough. Using tanks, artillery, airborne forces, engineers, and a mass of infantry, they developed a doctrine called Deep Operations to overcome a defense in depth and achieve a decisive victory. To exploit initial success, Isserson calculated that the Red Army must echelon forces to penetrate 100 to 120 kilometers deep. Such a penetration would overrun enemy command posts, artillery, operational reserves, and railheads critical for sustainment. These theories would eventually be put into practice during the Red Army’s spectacular victories like Operation Bagration.
But the war in Ukraine has seen a new difficulty to the operational-level breakthrough added. The increasing density and depth of drone operations have meant that Ukraine and Russia have struggled to achieve the surprise, mass, and tempo required to break through enemy defenses at scale. As a prime example of the difficulty of a breakthrough, on July 22, Russia consolidated units to attempt a breakthrough against the Ukrainian 1st Corps. The Ukrainian Corps received early indicators of the attack and targeted the enemy when they were still 70 to 120 kilometers from the front. The corps destroyed over sixty vehicles, and the attack never reached Ukrainian lines.
To have the hope of accomplishing a breakthrough, one side would first have to achieve drone dominance over a section of the front. Both sides have recognized, just like air war theorists a century ago, that the best method to achieve that dominance is by destroying drone launch sites, operators, and support systems on the ground. This requires targeting drone infrastructure at depth.
The First Movement: Prelude to Victory
Ukraine has laid the foundations for a breakthrough. During his tenure as defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov recognized that Ukraine needed to fight deep behind Russian lines because. “Russia always works at operational depth,” he said. “This is how Russian doctrine is built; Russia essentially created the concept.” Indeed, Isserson, the Soviet deep operations theorist, wrote in 1937 that “In foreign bourgeois literature we cannot find the same concept of deep combat which already lies at the foundation of our tactics.” Therefore, Fedorov prioritized the transformation to a higher-echelon corps system, which allowed Ukraine to fight at depth and enabled a shift from fighting a tactical, attritional fight to an operational-level one.
To strike Russia at depth, Fedorov introduced the middle-strike campaign, explaining: “[First-person-view] drones reshaped the tactical level of warfare. Deep-strike drones and missiles hit strategic targets deep inside Russia. Middle-strike operations fill the gap between them, enabling systematic strikes at ranges of around 30-200 km.” The campaign sought to target “critical infrastructure that supports the front line: ammunition depots, command posts, supply routes, air defense systems, radars, and drone control centers.” In 2026, Fedorov put five times more funds toward the procurement of middle-strike systems than in 2025, like the $5,000 AI-enabled Hornet drone. The Ministry of Defense reported that between January and June 2026, successful drone strikes beyond fifty kilometers increased forty-four times.
The campaign involved more than just drones; for example, Fedorov also prioritized extended-range artillery ammunition. He pushed for domestic production of 155-millimeter rounds with ranges over thirty kilometers and canceled purchases of shorter-range rounds. He recognized that since artillery emplaced far to the rear to avoid observation and since the dispersed close fight in the contested zone was often twenty kilometers wide, rounds with ranges under thirty kilometers contributed little to the fight—especially considering 155-millimeter artillery was often consolidated into corps artillery units for deep targeting, he saw no use in providing them with short-range ammunition.
Ukraine began to dominate Russia at depth by first targeting radar and air defense systems. Between March and May 2026, Ukraine reportedly destroyed eighty-one air defense systems. On May 27, Fedorov transitioned to the “logistics lockdown” campaign to “systematically destroy Russian logistics, warehouses, equipment, command posts, and supply routes at operational depth.” Russian logistics have been severed along the highways and railways that provide Russia’s primary lines of communications in southern Ukraine.
This campaign degraded Russian drone operations. Ukrainian units have searched the battlefield in depth to destroy Russian drone operators and launch sites. Due to the logistics lockdown, Russia struggles to send replacement operators, drones, and parts. Reinforcing this campaign, which has knocked out 50 percent of Russia’s oil refining capacity, the middle-strike campaign has exacerbated fuel shortages. Russian drone operators face challenges in finding fuel to charge their drones or radios. Fedorov also persuaded Elon Musk to turn off StarLink for Russian forces, which added a further disruption to their drone operations.
The Second Movement: Momentum for Victory
Operation Vivaldi demonstrated how when Russia’s problems mount, opportunities may emerge for breakthroughs; the question remains whether Ukraine has organized to exploit them at the scale and tempo required for a decisive victory. While Ukraine has had tactical success in Lyman, it has not turned it into an operational-level victory by overrunning Russian rear areas. The salient may have been defeated, but Russia had ample time to reorganize a defensive line behind the Zherebets River.
To maintain the momentum of an offensive, Ukraine needs an operational concept of how several corps can infiltrate with infantry and unmanned ground systems to penetrate Russian defensive lines and then rapidly exploit those openings with multiple mechanized brigades. After his removal, Fedorov recognized that his primary unfinished work was solidifying the corps system. A handful of corps are highly capable, but many lack staff training to manage the deep fight. Most corps have not had sufficient time with subordinate brigades to rehearse and develop the techniques necessary for a breakthrough. Ukraine has begun massing multiple corps formations but needs to create an echelon that can effectively command several corps in an offensive.
For any breakthrough, surprise remains essential. To achieve surprise in World War I, armies developed techniques and artillery concentrations that enabled them to transition from the week-long artillery preparation at the Somme to the ten-minute, intense barrage at Cambrai. Similarly, Ukraine will need to consolidate Unmanned Systems Forces brigades at the breakthrough to rapidly achieve a sufficient massing of drones across the battlefield’s depth before Russia can reposition forces.
After blinding Russian forces through a temporary window of drone dominance, Ukraine would then need to isolate the breakthrough area by disrupting communications, destroying command posts, and interdicting reserves. Ukraine should organize its drones and artillery within its corps and brigades so that it simultaneously neutralizes Russia in depth while providing responsive fires to its maneuver forces to continue their momentum.
Fortunately for Ukraine, Russian officers’ overly optimistic reports to their superiors will likely slow Russia’s response to a breakthrough. False reports of Russian success around Lyman had reached Putin, who bragged about it just as Russian forces there were collapsing. As one Russian source colorfully criticized the Russian chain of command, “Is there a guy among you—for f*ck’s sake—who can tell Uncle Vova [Putin] that his picture isn’t actually all that pretty, or are you all just f*cking losers? I’ll tell him. Just bring me in, I’ll tell him it’s all gone to sh*t. . . . We’re totally f*cked on the Lyman front.”
Additionally, once drone dominance is achieved, Ukraine should find penetrating Russian defenses relatively straightforward compared to its attempts during the failed spring 2023 counteroffensive. Russian forces are no longer ensconced behind the Surovikin Line with its dense minefields and multiple lines of fortifications. Rather, they are dispersed in the broad contested zone, both hiding from drones and relying on them for early warning. Without drone coverage, many of Russia’s thinly defended positions might be bypassed by infiltrating forces entirely.
Finally, to maintain momentum, Ukrainian forces will need the initiative to aggressively exploit Russian vulnerabilities. Promisingly, Syrskyi’s replacement, Mykhailo Draptyi, has stated that one of his objectives is to implement the principles of mission command into the armed forces to increase the speed and effectiveness of their operations. However, once unleashed beyond no man’s land, Ukrainian forces must be prepared to charge forward to exploit the breakthrough with the spirit they demonstrated during the Kharkiv counteroffensive.
The Third Movement: Mobilizing for Victory
Of course, war is not a tune played by one side; it is a dance between adversaries. Russia adapts, learns, and mobilizes additional resources. The Rubicon drone units may have been defeated in Lyman, but they have also been striving to achieve drone dominance by systemically targeting Ukrainian operators and launch sites. Fighting in the south, Ukraine’s 1st Corps has reported that Rubicon has amassed 1,200 drone crews to perform its own version of Vivaldi. Beyond the battlefield, Russia has expanded ballistic missile production to exploit worldwide shortages in Patriot interceptors. And rumors swirl that Putin may launch another draft after the upcoming elections.
To prevail, Ukraine’s leaders will need to rapidly and fully mobilize its society to support its theory of victory. Once, Ukrainians rallied to defend their homeland; now, 90 percent of recruits are drafted. The draft officials are deeply unpopular and accused of human rights abuses as they dragoon men into service. The government needs to reestablish a belief that there is a path to victory and that Ukrainians’ sacrifices are not in vain. Operation Vivaldi can play a role in renewing that faith.
Along with its people, Ukraine needs to ensure its defense industry maximizes production for the capabilities required for an operational breakthrough. It should prioritize the manufacturing of drones for the middle-strike campaign, like the Hornet, in sufficient mass to achieve drone dominance. Fedorov attempted to reform procurement and eliminate wasteful programs, but corruption still undermines the efficient employment of Ukraine’s limited resources and corrodes society’s faith in its institutions.
Finally, Ukraine must provide a clear theory of victory to mobilize the support of its international partners. Ukraine needs a narrative that explains to foreign donors what support to prioritize and how their support will contribute to victory. If Ukraine can demonstrate that it has a way forward, that it not only has cards but can win the game, then external powers are more likely to bet on it. Operation Vivaldi has shown that victory is possible.
We may have just heard the prelude to that victory. In his announcement of Operation Vivaldi, the 3rd Corps commander, Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, declared that “Vivaldi, as we know, has four seasons. This is just the first of them.”
Robert G. Rose is the chief research officer at the Modern War Institute. He holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Harvard University and, as a Gates Scholar, from Cambridge University.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Ukrainian Ground Forces
